Published on September 22, 2005 - The murder yesterday of two security officers following a tense stand-off between government officials and Muslim villagers in Narathiwat’s Ban Tanyong Limo underscores the absence of a concerted plan and strategy required for such urgent situations.

The incident not only reflects a lack of decisive leadership and the degree of difficulty that state officials find themselves up against in this restive region, where the local communities have never really trusted government officials, but also serves as testimony that the worst may be yet to come.

Villagers expressed their distrust of the Thai press and preference for Malaysian coverage of the incident. It was not clear what the presence of the Malaysian press would have achieved. If anything, the incident reflects the mindset of the local villagers, who are telling the world that they trust neither the Thai authorities nor the so-called independent Thai media.

In the struggle against the ongoing violence in the South, a conventional strategy – large numbers of troops with heavy firepower controlling the situation on the ground – was adopted from day one.

Psychological operations aimed at discrediting the insurgents and winning the hearts and minds of the local populace have never amounted to much. If anything, yesterday’s stand-off was proof of that.

Unlike the demonstrations and mass protests of previous years, Muslim women and children have now been given a role for local residents to vent their anger against state agencies. They acted forcefully to block the entrance to Ban Tanyong Limo.

While the two Marines who were tied up in a pavilion may not have been connected with the Tuesday-night shooting incident at a village tea shop that killed two men and wounded four others, they certainly appeared to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

It appears the villagers grabbed the first security officers they could find. Whether they really thought that would enhance their bargaining power with the state, from whom they demanded an immediate investigation – as well as the presence of Malaysian and other foreign journalists – will never really be known.

But the blockading of the village by hundreds of women and children, preventing the entrance of government officials and Thai journalists, was a statement in itself: we don’t trust the authorities and take your flunkies with you.

The incident was the second of its kind in less than a month. Three weeks ago, an imam in Ban Lahan village was gunned down. The incident provoked a similar angry stand-off, because villagers believed the cleric’s dying words that he had been shot by government officers.

But there have been ample warnings. As far back as three years ago, a group of Narathiwat villagers lynched two Border Patrol officers in broad daylight after a feisty stand-off. Many officials on the ground admitted at the time they feared a worsening situation, but political leaders in Bangkok did not pay the kind of attention needed to change local mindsets.

And so misunderstandings and mistrust still prevail today in the unruly South, where Muslim insurgents are trying to carve out a separate homeland for ethnic Malays, while local residents are stuck in the middle of the escalating strife.

Worse, since authorities are unable to contain the violence, conspiracy theories blaming state agencies for manufacturing the violence have become commonly accepted as fact. Although such a school of thought is nothing new, the government has never really seriously considered the need to understand local mentalities and attitudes towards the state.

That does not mean there have been no efforts to win hearts and minds. There have been plenty – the Thaksin Football League, the origami bird drop, the one-week “clinic” aimed at instilling a higher sense of patriotism.

But none appeared to hit the right spot. It was as if the authorities were acting just for the sake of acting.

What has clearly been lacking these past two years is any attempt to second-guess local reactions towards such government initiatives.

Not only did the government fail to anticipate public reactions, they ignored even the need to think things through and come up with possible scenarios.

Today, a full 20 months after scores of armed men raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat and made off with 300 automatic weapons, the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has crossed a threshold.

The battle in the South will require much more than a conventional military approach. While the struggle may be physical on one level, it is more in the hearts and minds of the local population.

It is no longer an issue of geographical control, but rather one of mindsets – between the ethnic Malays of the deep South and the rest of the country. And if the insurgents have their way, the battle will evolve into Muslim versus non-Muslim.

Don Pathan,
Supalak Ganjanakhundee