Published on Sep 21, 2006 - With the fifth anniversary of 9/11 now past, Southeast Asia remains an area of high priority in terms of American counter-terrorism assistance and general foreign policy concerns

Specifically motivating American concern is the prospect of the region developing into a "second front" for global jihadist extremism through the active co-option of local Muslim rebels into the wider, and allegedly al-Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamyaa (JI) network. However, while there is little doubt concerning the latter's own operational existence - large-scale suicide bombings in Bali (2002 and last year) and Jakarta (2003 and 2004) have effectively put this debate to rest - the degree to which home-grown Islamic groupings are decisively working to further its avowedly anti-Western and anti-secular cross-border designs is far more difficult to ascertain.

To be sure, it would seem that certain connections do exist. It is well known, for instance, that an intricate pattern of personal ties has grown up between Islamists in Southeast Asia. Many of these relationships were first forged in the crucible of the anti-Soviet mujahideen campaign in Afghanistan and have since been bolstered by marriages and tribal affiliations that frequently cut across specific group affiliations.

Logistically, growing evidence has also emerged that training facilities run by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao have been used for instructing Indonesian militants, several of whom have subsequently been identified as prominent JI commanders.

Equally, at least some organisational coordination appears to have taken place for JI operations in Southeast Asia. One notable case in point was the December 2001 plot to bomb several high-profile venues in Singapore, including the deep-sea water port at Changi, the Defence Ministry, diplomatic missions of Great Britain, Australia, Israel and the United States and commercial complexes housing Western business interests. A key figure in helping to fine tune the mechanics for the planned attacks was the late Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi - a close associate of Riduan Issamudin (aka "Hambali" - a key JI field commander) and former senior explosives expert in the MILF.

That said, there are several reasons to question the extent to which domestic rebel groups have come to re-define their operational and ideological agenda in more explicit pan-regional terms. The broad nature of Islamic radicalism in areas such as southern Thailand and the southern Philippines differs from the Wahabist, cross-border orientation favoured by JI - tending in most cases to be driven by objectives rooted in unique historical ethno-national grievances.

Moreover, the increasingly disaggregated character of JI combined with the dispersed nature of groups such as MILF and ASG make it difficult to gauge whether relationships are the product of ad-hoc initiatives stemming from so-called "lost commands" or reflect more formalised sanctioned directives emanating from central group leaderships. Just as problematic is the question of the permanence of any links that have been established and the extent to which these continue to factor into overall ideological and operational agendas.

Beyond these considerations, it is apparent that in a number of cases Southeast Asian governments have conspicuously played the fundamentalist "card" to justify a crackdown on Muslim opposition parties. In Malaysia, for example, several dozen of the militants detained under the country's Internal Security Act (ISA) for belonging to the now defunct Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) are also party functionaries or provincial religious leaders within the Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS) - the main rival to the predominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). While residual connections may exist between these individuals, Kuala Lumpur has yet to provide any conclusive evidence that this is the case. Indeed the very use of the ISA precludes such a requirement as it effectively allows suspects to be held indefinitely without trial. The problem with this approach is that it inevitably casts doubt on the veracity of wider intelligence claims pertaining to what may very well be established links between local and transnational entities.

These ambiguities represent more than simple academic interest, having direct implications for American foreign policy and security assistance in Southeast Asia. Indeed, without an informed and accurate picture of the scope and extent of militant Islam's penetration into the region, it will arguably be impossible for Washington to frame a viable and consistent counter-terrorist strategy that marshals resources within and across sovereign jurisdictions in the most expeditious manner possible.

If Washington is to accurately track, measure and counter transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia it is accordingly critical that current gaps in understandings of the regional jihadist phenomenon are addressed. A thorough grasp of the parameters surrounding militant Islamist extremism will not only allow for a more rigorous and nuanced debate on how best to tailor US law enforcement, judicial and intelligence assistance in this part of the world, it will also help with the generation of counter-terrorism modalities that are relevant, credible (especially to wider civic audiences) and sustainable.

Peter Chalk is the senior policy analyst for the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California. William Rosenau is a policy analyst for the Rand Corporation in Washington DC.