Published on Oct 05, 2006 - On-going and heightened violence in southern Thailand continues to evoke fears in the west that the country's Malay Muslim dominated provinces - Yala, Pattani and Narithiwat – may be emerging as a new front for cross-border terrorism in Southeast Asia. In particular are fears that outside militants, including cadres with ties to the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, could be establishing a logistical and operational foothold to further the ideological designs of pan-regional jihadism and its struggle against modernity, secularism and capitalism. However while the scale, scope and tempo of the insurgency is certainly on a scale not witnessed in the past, there is currently little indication that this due to external influences.

Despite lacking clear organizational coherence, Islamist rebels currently operating in southern Thailand have clearly taken their campaign of violence to a level of intensity and ruthlessness not seen in the past. According to statistics from Prince Songkla University, in the 32 months between January 2004 and the end of August 2006 5460 insurgent attacks took place in the Malay-Muslim provinces, leaving 1730 dead (which equates to an average of 52 fatalities a month, or nearly two a day) and 2513 wounded. This stands in stark contrast to figures recorded during the 1990s when the annual incident rate typically hovered around the 700 mark.

The ability to pull off audacious and complex operations has also expanded. Most attacks are now integrated and executed along a full modality spectrum – often embracing explosions, arson, assassinations and random shootings – to maximize overall impact. Coordinated bombings are also surfacing with more regularity. One notable case occurred in April 2005 when simultaneous explosions struck the Hat Yai International Airport, the French-owned Carrefour supermarket and the Green Palace World Hotel in Songkla. The attacks generated widespread concern - both in Thailand and regionally - not least because they represented the first time that Malay extremists had struck outside the insurgent-plagued provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narithiwat. More recently were last August's spate of bombings that targeted 22 commercial banks in Yala town. Although the casualty count was low, most local commentators believe this was more by design than luck with the strike intended more as a statement of extended regional capability than a concerted attempt to kill en mass.

Finally, the nature of the current bout of instability in the south has been marked by an explicit religious, jihadist undertone of a sort not apparent in past years. Reflective of this have been frequent attacks against drinking houses, gambling halls, karaoke bars and other establishments associated with western decadence and secularism; the distribution of leaflets (allegedly printed in Malaysia) specifically warning locals of reprisals if they do not adopt traditional Muslim dress and fully the Friday holiday; and the increased targeting of monks and other Buddhist civilians - often through highly brutal means such as burnings and beheadings (between January 2004 and the end of August 2006, 16 decapitations were recorded in the region) – in an apparent Taliban-style effort to destroy societal fabric by fostering religious-communal fear, conflict and hatred.

To what extent can the altered and more acute nature of post-2004 unrest in southern Thailand be attributed to the type of JI-instigated fanaticism that has been apparent in other parts of Southeast Asia such as the southern Philippines? To be sure, it is reasonable to speculate that at least some outside intrusion has taken place. Certainly gaining an ideological presence in these types of opportunistic theater is a well recognized and established practice of JI and one that was integral to the institution of the mantiqi cell structure that characterized its operational development from the late 1990s onwards.

That said, there is (as yet) no concrete evidence to suggest the region has been decisively transformed into a new beachhead for pan-regional jihadism. Although there is a definite religious element to many of the attacks that are currently being perpetrated in the three Malay provinces, it is not apparent that this has altered the essential localized and nationalistic aspect of the conflict. At root, the objective remains very much focused on protecting the region's unique identity and traditional way of life – both from the (perceived) unjust incursions of the Thai Buddhist state and, just as importantly, the unprecedented influx of cross border movements of trade, commerce and people.

Equally, while it is true that the scale and sophistication of violence has increased, there is nothing to link this change in tempo to the input of punitive, absolutist JI imperatives. Indeed in the opinion of informed local commentators, the heightened intensity of attacks merely reflects learning and development of the part of indigenous rebel groups, possibly combined with the infusion of an increasingly competitive criminal interplay involving gambling syndicates, drug lords and corrupt members of the security forces and political elite. Moreover, these same sources are quick to point out that unlike the situations in Mindanao and Indonesia, there is no established expanse of rebel-held territory in Pattani, Yala or Narithiwat that external extremists could actually use to institute a concerted regimen of international terrorist and doctrinal training.

Perhaps the clearest reason to believe that the southern Thai conflict has not metastasized into a broader jihadist struggle, however, is the fact that there has neither been a migration of violence north (much less to other parts of Southeast Asia) nor have there been directed attacks against foreigners, tourist resorts (such as Phuket) or overt symbols of American "cultural capitalism" (such as McDonalds, Starbucks or the Hard Rock Café). Indeed, there appears to have been a deliberate strategic decision on the part of militants on the ground to explicitly not tie the Malay cause to wider Islamic anti-western/secular designs for fear that this will both undermine the perceived credibility of their local commitment (and thereby threaten popular support) as well as prompt the international community to crack down on the insurgency as a manifestation of pan-regional jihadist extremism. In the words of one former southern Thai militant: "There is no interest in taking operations to Bangkok or Phuket. We do not need to be on anyone's terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over."

Peter Chalk
Peter Chalk is the Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation