Army's abuses come home to roost in South
By Don Pathan
The Nation
Published on May 30, 2008
There were high hopes among observers of Thailand's southern conflict that the justice system would prevail when Army Chief General Anupong Paochinda vowed to get to the bottom of the death of a Narathiwat imam who was killed while in military custody last March.
It was reported that he died from internal bleeding. His ribs were cracked, apparently from being kicked repeatedly while soldiers interrogated him.
Authorities tried but failed to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family who are demanding answers in the death of their family head.
News of his death spread like wildfire, seriously undermining the already fragile relationship between Thai security forces and the Muslim Malay community in the restive region.
Anupong, who was in the deep South the following day on an official visit, said he would set up a committee to investigate the imam's death. Bangkok-based diplomats and human-rights advocates initially supported Anupong's response.
But today, two months later, there is a growing concern that Yupa's case would go down the road to oblivion. Yupa's daughter has filed a formal complaint with the police, putting her last hopes with the country's legal system.
But like other controversial cases against state security agencies operating in the region, attempting to reach an out-of-court settlement or sitting on the case long enough for it to be forgotten, appears to be the preferred mode of operation.
According to the Muslim Attorney Centre's Kitcha Ali-ishoh, who handles hundreds of cases in the deep South where violence has claimed more than 3,000 lives, most of them Malay Muslims, Yapa 's case has yet to move beyond the police station.
Army spokesman Colonel Acra Thiproch said the case is in the legal pipeline but couldn't say when the system will render its verdict.
Kitcha said the system as it stands is stacked against defendants.
"Hundreds of cases have been handed to the attorney general. Not one has been rejected in spite of the fact that, as past cases have shown, most of these allegations have no merit," Kitcha said.
In other words, young men are locked up for months, and at times for years, until their cases are brought to court. Most are eventually set free as the evidence against them is lacking. The waiting period, which offers virtually no opportunity for bail, has become a bargaining chip in itself, Kitcha said.
From a bird's eye view, law enforcement is acting on what they believe, but not on what they can prove in a court of law.
Intelligence work over the years has not only failed to curb the violence in the South, but has made little headway in getting into the heart of the network of insurgents. Information leading to the arrest or detention of suspects is mainly based on secondary sources and often solicited through torture.
While torture has long been suspected to be part of interrogations, recent years have seen a growing number of people coming forward to accuse authorities of torturing them while under detention.
Information about suspects usually comes from secondary sources, instead of solid evidence that could hold up in court, Kitcha said.
These suspects are "invited for questioning" by authorities who have the power under martial law to hold them incommunicado for seven days and if needed, to extend that period by 30 days.
From June to November of last year, thousands of young men were detained following a series of blind sweeps through villages in highly contested areas.
The courts intervened in the Army project that saw hundreds of young men sent against their will to military camps in the upper South for what was supposed to be "job training". The court, however, ruled that the scheme was unconstitutional and ordered it to stop.
A current public-relations campaign by the Internal Security Operation Command capitalised on the fact that the overall number of attacks, especially on soft targets, has gone down in recent months. But according to Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, the number of attacks may have decreased, but recent attacks have become much more accurate and deadly.
While newer recruits continue to carry out regular disturbances, the more experienced commandos take out security convoys and military installations, he said.
"Having more men and more guns does not guarantee success," said Sunai. "Widespread abuse and impunity in counterinsurgency operations have made the ground fertile for recruitment and radicalisation, making it likely for the insurgency to continue for generations."
Part of the difficulty in breaking the back of the insurgents is that they have ample recruits on the ground. The fact that this generation of militants is so organic and decentralised makes any comprehensive, across the board strategy irrelevant.
Moreover, it is premature and misleading for Thai authorities to congratulate themselves on the declining number of attacks without taking serious action on the root causes of the conflict - which they have created. The conduct of the security forces, as seen in Yapa 's case, as well as controversial policies, are driving young Malay Muslim men into the arms of the insurgents.
The military justifies its controversial actions on the ground by saying that it is trying to weed out bad apples.But for local Malay Muslims, with their historic mistrust of the state apparatus and government agencies, these controversial efforts reinforce the notion that the Thai authorities are colonial masters.
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