Published on December 7, 2009 -

In some ways, the timing is awfully bad for Thailand, not so much because of the internal political bickering between the red and yellow shirts. It's because the administration is at a loss as to what to do about the conflict in the deep South, a topic that is certain to be high on the agenda when the two leaders meet in Bangkok prior to making a joint visit to the restive region.

While publicly acknowledging that the insurgency is Thailand's internal problem, Najib will be taking note as to what direction Thailand will take to change the course of the conflict and bring it under control. Judging from Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's recent repeated rhetoric - how development and more political participation at the local level could solve the problem - the Malaysian leader is likely to be disappointed because of the lack of progress. The confidence-building measure with the southern Muslims has also taken its toll on the government's secret peace process with separatist groups.

The idea of talking to the enemy, at least in a more systematic and strategic fashion, was floated by then prime minister Surayud Chulanont. Just before leaving office, Surayud met personally with representatives from the Patani United Liberation Organisation during a brief stopover in Bahrain in 2007. Malaysian authorities helped with the arrangements.

Kuala Lumpur wanted to "mediate" the process but Bangkok did not see the Malaysian government as an honest broker and the best they could do was to "facilitate" the process.

The following administrations of the late Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat were too bogged down with the street protests and did not give the peace process due attention.

Abhisit, meanwhile, is trying to pick up the pieces from where Surayud left off. A new National Security Council chief who supports the idea of establishing a peace process was appointed and a team of trusted associates was set up to meet with members of the longstanding separatist groups, commonly referred to as the old guard.

The idea was to get the old guard to broker a peace deal with the new generation of insurgents on the ground.

This might be a long shot, but it was the only channel they had to the militants who don't seem to be that enthusiastic about the idea of talking in the first place.

"The way they see it, they are winning," said one exiled leader in reference to the younger generation of militants on the ground, locally known as the juwae, or fighters in the local Malay dialect.

According to sources inside the government and the exiled community of separatists, Abhisit's initiative was gaining some traction. The old guard, namely Pulo and Barisan Revolusi Nasional, succeeded in getting the new generation to give the process the time of day.

But before the process could gain serious momentum, a massacre in Narathiwat's district of Joh I Rong jolted the whole process.

A former Buddhist ranger identified by police as Suthirak Kongsuwan led a five-man team with assault rifles and a shotgun to mow down a mosque full of Muslims who were right in the middle of evening prayers. They killed 11 people and wounded 12.

Photographs of the five suspects have surfaced and circulated around the region, putting the top brass and government in an extremely awkward position.

Officials in the region said this information was leaked to pressure the government into arresting these men, who many believe were the product of "security outsourcing", a fancy name for a death squad working for local military units.

Immediately after the June 8 massacre, the juwae, as well as some of the hard-liners in the exiled community, said they would not endorse the peace process until the massacre is resolved.

Political insiders said Abhisit has not been able to move on the promise of bringing justice to the Ai Bayae mosque massacre because of stiff resistance from security forces.

"People with half a brain understand that this is holding up the peace process," said Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk.

"Failure to prosecute those murderers reaffirms longstanding grievances in the Muslim community that Bangkok isn't committed to give them justice or treat them as equals."

Among the supporters of the peace process, there is an acknowledgement that the Malaysians have done their part and the ball is now in Thailand's court. Kuala Lumpur authorities suggested to the Patani Malay exiled community to formulate a common position and then work with the Thais on this peace process.

Thailand is going to have to respond because the mandate for the peace process came from Bangkok in the first place.

But judging from the activities of the military on the ground, meeting the Malaysians halfway will not be easy.

For one thing, they just don't like the idea of talking to the enemy; they think their military might, coupled with development money, can solve the problem, a number of Thai security officials have said.

Furthermore, spin doctors from the Fourth Army Area overseeing the deep South has been distorting facts by shifting the blame for the massacre on the juwae.

The names of known suspected insurgents allegedly linked to other high-profile incidents, such as the guns, grenade and car-bomb attacks in Sungai Kolok on October 6, were made to appear that they were involved in the Ai Bayae massacre.

"Apparently, the military does not want to see this peace process get off the ground, thus the foot-dragging in the investigation, not to mention the effort to distort the facts," Sunai said.

According to Sunai, no one seems to understand the significance of Najib's visit to the Malay-speaking South.

If anything, his presence amounts to telling the ethnic Malays in the deep South that they need to come to terms with their Thai citizenship and reconcile their differences with the Thais.

Abhisit, on the other hand, can reciprocate by telling the Malays in Patani that their Thai citizenship will not come at the expense of their identity or their place in the Malay world.

Acknowledging that the people in the deep South embrace a different set of historical narratives may be welcomed by the Malays in Thailand's deep South.

 But for the juwae on the ground, it may be a case of too little and too late. The stakes appear to be higher now, especially after the mosque massacre.