Patani has been quiet for the last 10 years, but now we are witnessing the return of violence all over again. How and why did this happen?

I never believed that we had any real “peace” in the region, and during that time the policies and methods of the Thai government in Bangkok never really changed either. The “quiet” 10 years were really a period of training for those separatist groups that preferred the path to violence. Ten years ago, when more than 30 schools were burned by some militant groups, the leaders of these groups claimed to me personally that in 10 years time they would intensify the violence to an unprecedented level. Now, nearly 10 years later, we see violence returning to the region. I believe this is the result of long-term training and preparation for the violence we are seeing now. These are some of the groups that have never really agreed with the suggestion that we engage in open dialogue with the Thai government, and have never really given up armed struggle.

If the violence has worsened and is about to escalate even further, what were the mistakes in the recent past that have caused the situation to deteriorate to such an extent? What was the role of the Thai government in all this?

As I’ve said the methods and tactics of the Thai political and military elite have never really changed. Just look at what happened recently at Tak Bai, when 86 people were killed when they were stuffed into lorries by the police. It was just a demonstration that got out of control, but there was no need to resort to such a level of repression afterwards, and the result is that there is even more hate and anger among the people.

The Thai government believed and still believes that the separatist movements were phased out and have disappeared. There is the mistaken belief that the separatist groups have no popular support, and thinking that political participation on the part of the Patani Muslims meant that the era of militant struggle was over.

There was also the belief that the separatist movement could be “bought out” by development projects; which, incidentally, never materialised. But the separatist movement could never be eradicated because this is a cultural-political issue. The historical, ethnic, cultural and religious factors are important. The Thai government has always felt that this was a problem of assimilation and that the Malays had to be assimilated, integrated into the system and “made into Thais” so to speak. But the Malays in Patani realise that they are not foreigners, and that in fact their territory has been colonised by Thais, who were originally a foreign power.

More importantly, the young people of Patani today seem more and more inclined to cultural politics of religious grounds. During my youth, my generation were nationalists. This was the key theme in the 1970s. But today the resurgence of Islam worldwide gives the separatist movement a more religious flavour, and we see the Islamists working closer with the nationalists . . .

How have the policies of the present Thaksin administration affected things?
Thaksin’s mistakes have been tactical and demonstrate his insensitivity. He has made many mistakes on the ground level there. For example, Thaksin has visited the Patani region only twice, and on both occasions he hardly showed any concern for the Muslims in Patani. After all, he is coming to our area, our Malay territory.

But what did Thaksin do when he was in Patani? Did he visit the Muslim communities or talk to our leaders? Did he go to the Malay villages to see how poor our people are, and did he ask how his government could help them?
No, he went instead to visit the Thai Buddhist temples and even stayed there. He talked about Thai-Buddhist nationalism and how Thai cultural identity was and should be the basis of Thai national politics - but he was doing this in a Malay-Muslim area and paid no attention at all to our sensitivities. Why should we Malays assimilate to Thai culture, learn the Thai language, eat and dress like the Thais when we are in fact living in our own territory and the homeland of our fathers and forefathers? Patani, Jala, Narathiwat have always been Malay territory, as long as history goes back and even before the establishment of Bangkok. Yet our history is totally ignored and erased, and Thaksin emphasises the need for us to assimilate to the mainstream; the mainstream Thai society never thinks of taking us into consideration too.

Assimilation to what extent and how?
This policy of “Thai-sation” goes back centuries, and for a long time we were told we could not even speak our Malay language, use our Malay script, etc. Yet in Patani there are Chinese schools where Chinese languages are taught and the Chinese script is used. In each of the provincial capitals of Patani, Jala and Narathiwat, there is at least one Chinese-medium school that teaches in Chinese. If the Chinese can be allowed to have their sense of cultural identity, why can’t we?
You see we are not demanding special privileges, nor are we saying we are superior to the Thais. We simply want to be recognised for the people we are, with our history and culture too. Is that a threat to the Thai state or Thai nation? I don’t think so - we are merely demanding recognition and respect, and that is the basis for any multiracial society and working democracy.

Since September 11, many separatist groups all over the world have been labelled “terrorist” groups by their respective governments. Sometimes this was done to get added support from the West; sometimes this is done to justify the persecution of legitimate political opponents. How has this affected your activities?

In fact I personally do not think that Thaksin’s administration has used the “terrorist” label against us very much so far. This may change later, but for now they tend to condemn us as a local threat and local problem, and the struggle in their eyes at least is merely an insurgency. More often they accuse us of being “unpatriotic” . . . but rarely have we been labelled a “terrorist” threat.

The reason why Thaksin has been cautious, I feel, is this: Thailand is still recovering from the 1997 economic crisis and the Thai government is aware of how fragile the economy is. In many parts of the country the local economy is based on tourism and foreign revenue earnings from . . . tourists. If Thaksin plays the “terrorist menace” card, the immediate impact would be to send the wrong signal that Thailand is a network or safe harbour for militant terrorist groups. This would damage the image of Thailand and possibly drive off foreign tourists . . . As much as the Thai security forces want to eradicate us, using whatever means necessary, they are worried about long-lasting negative effects and negative publicity. So their hands are tied in a sense.

Dr Farish A Noor is a researcher at the Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin and was formerly Chair of Asian Studies at Sciences-Po, Paris and a lecturer at the Islamwissenschaft Institute of Freie University, Berlin.