April 11, 2013 00:00 By Bertil Lintner
More than one battle is underway in Myanmar, with policy contortions little understood by the outside world. There's the government's ongoing struggle with ethnic resistance armies and then the larger struggle between the West and China for influence.
Foreign intervention in Myanmar’s peace process is becoming a war by proxy, dividing policymakers in every country involved.
The Myanmar government seems intent on a military solution to its trouble with ethnic insurgency. As delegates gathered for March talks with insurgents in the border town of Ruili, hundreds of Myanmar army trucks were sending soldiers and heavy equipment into Kachin State.
Yet in Europe only a few days earlier, President Thein Sein, ex-general-turned-civilian politician, proclaimed, “There’s no more fighting in the country, we have been able to end armed conflict” between government forces and ethnic resistance armies. This despite almost daily attacks against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the far north, frequent skirmishes with the Shan State Army in Shan State – a group that has an official ceasefire agreement with central authorities – and more government troops taking up new positions in Karen State in the hills bordering Thailand.
While NGOs and think tanks are scrambling to engage in Myanmar peacemaking, the mighty neighbour to the north is taking charge. On March 13, former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao admitted that decades-long ethnic conflicts are having a severe impact on cross-border trade, yet China would continue to develop cooperative relations “based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, including non-interference in each other'’ internal affairs”.
The fact is that China has a long history of involvement in Myanmar’s internal affairs, dating back to its massive military support for the now-defunct insurgent Communist Party of Burma from 1968 to 1978. Today, China has a direct interest in stability in Myanmar and Kachin State, in particular, where it has large investment in mineral exploration, hydroelectric-power generation, retail trade and agro-industry.
Chinese methods for promoting peace differ considerably from the “peace-and-reconciliation-through-dialogue” approach of Western interlocutors. In Kachin State, China is waving a carrot to the government in Nay Pyi Daw by putting pressure on the KIA and allowing Myanmar troops to detour through Chinese territory. China is waving a big stick as well. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 21, China supplied Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic militia, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), with large quantities of military hardware. Chinese-made armoured personnel carriers with machine-guns have been spotted in the UWSA’s Panghsang headquarters in Myanmar across the Yunnan frontier.
The UWSA has had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government since 1989. China does not want another war. By letting the UWSA acquire heavy weaponry, China sends a strong message to Nay Pyi Daw: Don’t mess with us.
It’s hardly secret that China is unhappy with Myanmar’s moves to improve relations with the West, especially, the US. Beijing is still smarting from the Myanmar government’s decision in September 2011 to suspend construction of a US$3.6 billion China-backed mega-dam in Kachin State, which would have flooded 600 square kilometres of forest, displaced thousands of villagers and supplied 90 per cent of its electricity to China. Two months later, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton paid a historic visit to Myanmar. Myanmar’s drift away from its close relationship with China had begun, and the West responded with enthusiasm. Sanctions were eased, aid and investment pledged; criticism of rights abuses by the Myanmar army in minority areas all but disappeared from agendas of Western governments.
China’s involvement in the peace process began in earnest when, on January 19, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Fu Ying visited Myanmar and met Thein Sein as well as General Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Fu, known for her plain-speaking in diplomacy, reportedly made it clear that China wanted fighting in Kachin State to stop. From 1994 to 2011, the KIA had a ceasefire agreement with the government, but that broke down over disagreement about Myanmar’s governance, whether it should be a federal union or a centralised state with no real autonomy for the ethnic areas.
Chinese-sponsored peace talks were held in Ruili in Yunnan Province on February 3. Beijing sent Luo Zhaohui, former ambassador to Pakistan and now director-general of the Department of Asian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, to observe the process. A second round of talks at Ruili on March 11 was attended by Wang Yingfan, another high-ranking minister of foreign affairs.
The Chinese intervention in Myanmar’s civil war casts doubts on the feasibility of foreign-mediation efforts – as does the proliferation of Western organisations which have turned peace in Myanmar into a virtual industry and, for some, a lucrative business. The Norwegian-initiated Myanmar Peace Support Initiative has been followed by similar efforts by the Switzerland-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Nippon Foundation of Japan and EU-sponsored initiatives through the Myanmar Peace Centre, an entity close to the Myanmar government. The Institute for Security and Development Policy, a Swedish think tank, also has EU funding for “national reconciliation and peace-building” with ethnic groups, while Pacta, a Finnish NGO, looks for opportunities as well. The Phnom Penh-based Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies is involved, too, as are at least six individuals with private agendas. Millions of dollars and euros are at stake in these efforts.
The outcome has been overlapping initiatives, rivalry among organisations – and more often than not a lack of understanding by inexperienced “peacemakers” of the conflicts’ root causes. This is not to say that the Chinese approach has been more sophisticated. On Radio Beijing, Chinese academics have suggested that the main problem is that the Kachins and other ethnic minorities are not getting their fair share of local revenues – or turning decades of struggle for recognition of ethnic identity into a quest for mere economic benefit. The Kachins and others are quick to point out that government negotiators at the talks have no mandate to discuss political issues such as federalism. Thus, the talks are little more than talks about talks with little prospect of success.
The Chinese approach may also lack cohesion. In December, several closed-door meetings were held in Beijing where academics argued that the Chinese government should close the border and collaborate only with the Myanmar authorities to crush the KIA. Foreign Ministry officials reportedly warned that such a one-sided view could lead to an influx of Kachin refugees into Yunnan and possibly attacks on Chinese businesses and individuals.
Moreover, China must take into account that Yunnan has more than 130,000 ethnic Kachins. When the KIA was under fierce attack by helicopter gunships, fighter jets and heavy artillery in January, several thousand Chinese Kachins travelled by truck and bus to the border to show solidarity with brethren on the other side. Given the sensitivity of China’s handling of ethnic issue in regions such Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing cannot afford to antagonise yet another minority people, even if it is relatively small.
With both the West and China demonstrating ineptitude in refereeing Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, the internal wars that have plagued Myanmar since independence from Britain in 1948 appear nowhere near a solution.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist based in Thailand and the author of several works on Asia. He can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org.