DISAPPOINTED by Europe's uncharacteristic denial of its growing confidence and diplomatic profile, Turkey has gradually turned East of the Bosphorus River. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is flying to Hanoi this week to sign the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to begin a new strategic link and realignment with Southeast Asia and a broader Asia. It is a far cry from the past when Turkey's main obsession was to look to the West; and most importantly to integrate with the European Community.
In the case of the Mavi Marmara, two dozen activists from their non-government organisations and civil aid groups were aboard the Turkish ship carrying humanitarian assistance to Palestinians living in Gaza, when Israeli security forces stormed the vessel at the end of May, killing nine activists. Fortunately, their citizens were not among those killed.
Both governments were outraged and jointly condemned the Israeli actions. They pledged to work together to hold Israel responsible to the United Nations. In Malaysia, there were extremely strong reactions from all levels of society. Its Parliament passed a special resolution to condemn Israel and called for compensation for losses incurred during the raid.
Surviving Indonesian and Malaysian activists were being treated as national heroes when they returned home for standing up against Israel and helping their Muslim compatriots.
Their national leaders and politicians greeted and praised them as role models. Their survival of the mayhem was the talk of the town and local media has gone full throttle with attacks on the "Zionist" regime.
It is in this conducive political environment that the rise of Turkey has found Southeast Asia. Indeed, Turkey's interest in Asean is not new. It began a decade ago when Ankara wanted to promote its strategic location as a bridge between East and West. Long before, in the early 20th century, as far as Thailand was concerned, some Muslim separatists from Pattani wanted to pledge allegiance to the Ottoman Empire.
Fast track to the present, Turkey under the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan had been keen to join the European Community (EU).
It had taken up extensive reforms as required by the EU to prepare for this membership. In 2005 the discussion started and continued unabated but without the kind of EU enthusiasm that Turkey anticipated. In fact, the negotiation has deepened the divide between the two sides and among EU members. France and Germany have yet to be convinced that Turkey in the EU family would be an asset.
Roughly at the same time, Turkey applied to become a dialogue partner of Asean and its region-wide security group, the Asean Regional Forum. The desire to connect with Asia in a more tangible way through multiple memberships of existing regional organisations has become far more urgent and greater amid the condescending views coming from Europe.
Quite predictably, the grouping - with extensive ties with the West - did not respond to Turkey's eagerness for fear of being dragged into a chess game played by another powerful secular Muslim nation against its friends and alliance. In economic terms, Turkey has yet to convince Asean its economic performance and know-how would benefit the region's economy as much as other dialogue partners.
Such ambiguity towards Turkey was on public display in Phuket last July when Asean made a sudden U-turn after agreeing to include Turkey in the TAC community.
Indonesia, another secular Muslim nation, vehemently opposed Ankara's ascension despite previous endorsement. At the time, the argument zeroed in on the country's "ulterior motives". Previously some Asean members believed Turkey's desire to join TAC was part of a wider tactic to counter EU influence in the region. Its signing, if it went ahead as planned last year, would have permitted this Nato member (1952) the right to block the EU in joining the TAC as a new party to the Third Protocol.
This document enables a regional organisation such as the EU or the African Union to accede to the TAC; and consensus is needed among the high contracting parties from all 27 signatories.
The Second Protocol completed in 1998 allowed non-Southeast Asian countries to do so. Under the First Protocol—the first amendment to TAC in 1986—Papua New Guinea was the only country permitted to sign the TAC and it subsequently became an Asean observer.
Davutoglu, who took over as foreign minister last May, has impressed his Asean counterparts at various international meetings, including the recent Organisation of Islam Conference held in Tajikistan.
His zero conflict theory with neighbouring countries fits comfortably with the Asean mind-set and its TAC philosophy.
It is interesting to note that Turkey's proactive diplomacy has resonated extremely well with the majority of Asean members. After all, throughout its 43-year existence, Asean has been adept in playing balancing games with the West, which is also both main supporter and provocateur.
While Asean may have divergent views on international and regional issues - such as climate change or the South China Sea - the grouping is strongly united in its common position on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Past joint communiques of Asean leaders expressed unwavering support for the Palestinians' right of self-determination.
It should surprise no one if next week's Asean ministerial meeting issues a statement condemning Israel's blockade of Gaza.
Inevitably, Turkey will move quickly to consolidate its new-found ties with Asean following the TAC ascension. Accepting the regional code of conduct is a short cut and an effective way to making an inroad into Asean and beyond.