By August the government will face a tough dilemma - laying terrorism charges against the red shirts won't be so difficult, but making the charges stick will be an entirely different story.
Excluding the 30-day detention of the 11 red-shirt leaders under the emergency rules, the authorities have 84 more days to build up a case of terrorism before the remand expires.
Based on remarks by investigators and government leaders, the criminal probe led by the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) appears to be a leap in progress. It is noteworthy, however, that the remarks mostly stem from hunches.
Despite the month-long probe, investigators have very little evidence to back up their suspicions on the alleged conspiracy to conduct terrorism. To win a conviction against reds like Jatuporn Promphan and Nattawut Saikua, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt there exists a plot to overthrow the government by terrorism.
Since the men in black, suspected of belonging to the armed units of the red shirts, were responsible for the violence, the DSI has surprisingly failed to pursue the leads related to how the so-called terrorists acquired their military prowess. It opts for conducting a wild goose chase everywhere but within the military establishment.
The April 10 mayhem and the use of force by the men in black from May 14 to May 19 were reflected in a series of skirmishes with the security forces. Unless the investigators focus on probing past and present military ranks in order to re-enact the formation and tactical plans of the men in black, there is little hope of proving the terrorism conspiracy.
If the government is serious about charging the red-shirt leaders with terrorism and not just casting them off as pariahs, it is not too late to salvage the investigation to focus on evidence-gathering instead of making daily allegations based on political expediency.
It will be unfortunate indeed if a first case on terrorism against the reds goes awry. This would set a bad precedent on the enforcement of terrorism provisions as well as allow social divisions to fester. Without proof of their leaders' involvement in violence, the red shirts will likely resume their opposition movement rather than wither away.
Should the probe on terrorism make no satisfactory headway, it might be wise to switch track and focus on regular criminal offences, such as the instigation of violence, the sabotage and the attempted unseating of an elected government.
The prosecution of red-shirt leaders must succeed in bringing perpetrators of violence to justice, otherwise Thailand will see a never-ending use of force stemming from political rallies.
The country cannot advance if street protests are prone to degenerate into urban guerrilla war at the whim of agitators.
It might take years for the truth to emerge about the unrest and bloodshed. Pending the outcome of a myriad of independent probes, politicians in the coalition and the opposition camps should tone down their fiery rhetoric in passing the blame on one another.
It is evident the security forces and the protesters equally used force to wrestle control over each other, leading to the end of the Rajprasong rally. Both sides are mired with blood on their hands, hence it is childish and irresponsible to try to apportion blame.
The unrest should serve as lesson to prevent recurring violence. But it is unrealistic to expect accountability for bloodshed either from the government or the opposition. Past political mayhem, such as the Tak Bai and the Krue Se incidents, remains to torment society to this day.