In less than three days, the nine Supreme Court judges will find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place.
Their highly anticipated verdict on the Bt76-billion "frozen" assets of ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra is likely to have far-reaching political ramifications, but the bigger dilemma the judges face is outlining a ruling based on legal principles, not sentiment.
And while it's expected that justice will be served, the verdict may not ease the country's political volatility. The pro- and anti-Thaksin camps have already jumped to their own conclusions to enhance their respective agendas.
If the verdict favours the defence, then Thaksin will still have battles to fight - beating his conviction for a conflict of interest in the Ratchada land case and fleeing abroad to avoid a two-year jail term.
If the verdict goes against him, and Thaksin loses his fortune, he could be doubly motivated to unleash his fury.
Speculation on the verdict is rampant but the judicial decision might actually be a toss-up, mainly because the case is unprecedented.
This is the first judicial inquiry into abuse of power to enrich oneself - or "policy corruption" - an offence that has no legal precedent.
The past two asset-seizure cases, involving military strongmen Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn, were decided by executive decrees, while another involving the ousted Chatichai Choonhavan government was nullified on a legal technicality.
In Thaksin's case, the presiding judges are expected to debate three legal issues.
Firstly, whether this is a case of double jeopardy. In 2001, Thaksin was acquitted of asset concealment, while the key prosecution argument this time round is based on doubts over the concealment case.
Before completing the inquiry, the judges took the initiative to summon additional evidence, part of which related to Thaksin's wealth being held by nominees.
This might be a sign that the judges are trying to see if fresh evidence exists, because otherwise, the case might have to be dismissed on the legal technicality of trying someone for the same charge twice.
Secondly, the judges will have to provide a legal interpretation of what constitutes a policy corruption, which has not been done before. Several economic studies in Latin America have touched on the subject, but there is no judicial review anywhere in the world addressing this issue.
Thirdly, if Thaksin is found guilty, how will his ill-gotten gains be computed and seized. Thaksin was already a billionaire before entering politics. So, the judges will have to determine whether these billions were just "seed funds" to beget corruption or to separate "good" money from "bad".
Obviously, the political ramifications will vary depending on the outcome of the judicial review.
A guilty verdict with total asset seizure would inflame things further and the power struggle could continue with no end in sight.
A guilty verdict with a partial asset seizure would sustain the volatility, but the opposition movement's intensity might dissipate due to a weakening cause or ability to mobilise crowds.
An acquittal might thwart a confrontation, but volatility could persist if rival camps insist on fighting instead of mending fences.
As for the consequences for Thaksin: a favourable verdict, be it a complete or partial return of assets, would translate into him having to stop defying the judiciary and coming back to serve his jail term. He would, after all, have to maintain his credibility if he wants to stage a comeback.
