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If conspiracy theorists are getting out of control over the "attack" on the Army headquarters on January 14, the Army has largely itself to blame. The way it handled the incident was ambiguous at best, giving rise to conflicting theories. National security surely will be cited if critics start asking why there had to be so much secrecy, but then another question will have to be asked: are all the rumours and speculation at play right now good for national security?

As of now, we have heard four major theories. First, the "attack" was carried out by suspended senior officer Maj-General Khattiya Sawasdipol, who has burned all his bridges with Army chief Anupong Paochinda. Second, the "attack" was staged as a "prelude" to more incidents that could eventually justify new military intervention in politics. Third, a "third party" launched the grenade "attack" to cause fresh political gloom and uncertainty. And fourth, Khattiya was set up because he had crossed a few powerful people.

These notions have somewhat become basic theories whenever political violence aimed at individuals is concerned. Ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra used to be accused of staging a failed "car-bomb" attack on himself. Even Thaksin's archrival Sondhi Limthongkul was suspected by some of faking an assault on his own convoy, athough real bullets were used and one lodged itself in his skull.

However, the Army has not helped at all when it comes to the "grenade attack". The claimed incident was kept a secret for a week and admission was only made after the story was splashed across the front page when reporters inquired into why security had been increased for Anupong and his family. If there were any witnesses, |none has come forward or been allowed to talk to the media. No reporters have been to see the damage, and raids on the residences of Khattiya and his aides took place soon after the alleged January 14 incident made headlines.

Why raid the suspects' residences a week after the claimed attack occurred? Would the raids have been conducted if the media had not "exposed" the proclaimed incident? And while we can assume that those who have fired a grenade into the Army headquarters may decide for some reason to keep plenty of explosives at their homes a week after the attack, it's puzzling that Army investigators chose to rely on that possibility instead of launching a swift, sweeping search immediately after the assault.

Whether Khattiya is villain or victim in this case, suspicion will persist, not least because of the way the Army reacted to the alleged attack. The initial silence, then the outburst and the cat-and-mouse game with Khattiya - who was seen on many news channels on Friday denying involvement and pouring new scorn |on his superiors - are all ingredients for bad gossip |and rumour. It will go down as another mysterious incident that took place as a result of Thailand's |political crisis. If it was a real attack and not a political game, it is looking more like the latter - thanks to the Army.

In a recent interview, Anupong has suggested he is stuck in the middle of the political crisis, having been harshly criticised by both the red- and yellow-shirted movements. Being in his position is obviously not easy, and what happened on January 14 and the aftermath mean two things: either someone is making it much harder for him, or he's making it much harder for himself. As for Khattiya, he could be joining a growing band on the run, fairly or unfairly.