Still a long battle ahead in the quest for peace in the South

After making overtures to Phnom Penh, where he helped make last minute preparations for Thaksin Shinawatra's entry into Cambodia to turn up the heat on Thai government, Chavalit returned home to drop another bomb.

This time it was about the deep South, where the ongoing insurgency has claimed nearly 4,000 lives since January 2004. Chavalit proposed that the Malay-speaking South be made an autonomous region to quell the ongoing violence, to which there seems no end in sight.

"Parliamentary seats in the deep South are up for grabs as the ruling Democrat Party fails to respond to long-standing grievances and needs of Muslim voters," said Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch.

"Chavalit took this opportunity and used his proposal about autonomy and amnesty deals to put himself in the spotlight as the champion of southern Muslims."

Like typical Thai politicians, the Democrats shot down his idea, not because it was bad, but because it came from a man they despised. Even one of the long-standing separatist movements, the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), poured cold water on Chavalit's proposal, saying they don't want to be lured into this mud-slinging between the chairman of the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrats, who lead the coalition government.

Because of his poor track record in national politics, few are willing to give Chavalit the benefit of the doubt. In September 2008, Chavalit boldly announced that the end of the insurgency was in sight. Starting in October that year, there would be a steady decline in insurgent attacks. And by December 5, the violence would come to a complete stop, he predicted. He also used this announcement to poke fun at General Chettha Thanajaro, who made similar claims about the end of the southern insurgency. Chetta quickly became a laughing stock, as the whole thing was billed as a hoax.

Chavalit stepped down as deputy prime minister in the last administration to accept partial responsibility for the October 7, 2008 clashes in front of Parliament between the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the police.  

In the eyes of the Abhisit government, Chavalit is trying to sabotage the government's work in the deep South. At stake are the ongoing secret talks between a select handful of representatives from the government and the long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups. The initiative was started in late 2006 by the then interim prime minister Surayud Chulanont. Surayud himself, towards the end of his term, even held a face-to-face meeting with one of the separatist leaders, in Bahrain in late 2007.

The subsequent administrations of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat couldn't find the time, or see the need, to carry on the process. Abhisit, on the other hand, is trying to pick up where Surayud left off.

According to political insiders, the Army chief, General Anupong Paochinda, was not entirely comfortable with the idea of talking to the enemy, but has eventually seen the need for it. The negotiators have decided to stay out of Abhisit's way and allow the secret dialogue to take place.

Representatives from the Thai government who report directly to Abhisit have had several rounds of meeting with members of the separatist groups and others in the exiled Patani Malay community. A number of items have been on the table, include a "peace zone", pardons for certain convicted separatist leaders, some form of autonomy for the deep South, more space for Malay culture, and an official acknowledgement that the three southernmost provinces were once a Malay historical homeland.

Like Surayud, Abhisit's idea is to use the long-standing groups as an access point to the new generation of militants on the ground. But in order to do that, the old guard will have to do more to reduce the trust gap between themselves and the active militants, locally known as juwae, or "fighters", in the local Malay dialect. Many have acknowledged that their dialogue does not constitute a shared command.

Security officials opposed to the idea of talking to the insurgents, and in favour of a military solution, say that getting the old guard to talk sense to the new generation is a long shot. But then again, they are also admitting that there is no other way to communicate with these new, more extreme, militants if not through the old guard.

And so for the past few years, the old guard have worked hard to forge unity amongst themselves and solidify their position in order to convince both Thais and the active militants that they can make good on their promises.

And then came June 8, 2008, when a reportedly pro-government death squad massacred 11 people inside a Narathiwat village mosque, and wounded 12 others.

The militants on the ground demanded that the government display sincerity by arresting the perpetrators because, according to sources in the exiled community, the juwae were not responsible. So far, the police have issued the name of one suspect, Suthirak Khongsuwan, a Thai Buddhist who used to be a paramilitary ranger, but nothing more has been said.

"The government took Chavalit's bait by rejecting his proposal, which in fact was not really different from Prime Minister Abhisit's original ideas," said Sunai. "Such knee-jerk reactions have alienated the government from southern Muslims, who are now questioning Prime Minister's Abhisit sincerity about what he promised to be solution for the deep South."

For the time being, the strategy is to use military-run development programmes to win hearts and minds in the local communities in the deep South. The fact that few Muslim villagers have stepped forward to assist the government with this task suggests that the Thai security forces are still fighting an uphill battle. Unfortunately, the summit is nowhere in sight.