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Of late, Asean-China relations are not what they seem. Deep down, there are signs of wariness and complacency. While both sides still value their hard-won friendship and economic-focused transactions, factors that keep their ties vibrant are completely missing these days.

Worse still has been the new tendency for using aggressive rebuttals, emphasising sovereignty and nationalism, among claimants over the South China Sea disputes. They have forgotten they used to pledge self-restraint.

After Beijing first attended the 1991 Asean meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Asean-China relations have progressed at an unprecedented pace. There was a brief lull in 1995 during the stand-off between Asean and China over the Mischief Reefs in March 1995, leading to the first joint Asean condemnation of China.

A subsequent patch-up meeting a month later in Huangzhan, Hangzhou allowed Beijing to overhaul its foreign policy and make realistic assessments of Asean by recognising its collective power and expanding regional roles. Literally after the meeting, Beijing stopped perceiving Asean as an American bogeyman.

Since then, China has painstakingly built up mutual trust with Asean, which quickly led to closer all round cooperation. It spoke out loudly and supported fervently Asean initiatives and endeavours within and sometimes outside the region. China was the first dialogue partner to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003, and to offer a free trade pact with Asean, which will be effective in January 2010.

Furthermore, China's trade with and investment in Asean has become a huge regional engine of growth. Last year, China was the eighth largest investor and the grouping's fourth largest market. The current global financial crisis has also expanded China's role in the region.

Its gigantic stimulus packages have already benefited regional economic performance. Beijing's strong financial backing for the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, along with Japan and Korea, has pushed the scheme ahead. In August, a US$10 billion(Bt334 billion) "China-Asean Fund on Investment Cooperation" was set up by Beijing to support infrastructural development in the region on top of a longstanding credit of $15 billion to Asean members over the next three to five years.

After months of delay, at the Cha-Am summit this weekend, both sides will sign a memorandum to set up the Asean-China Centre in Beijing.

Such unequivocal collaboration and commitments have served as a benchmark of China's intimacy with Asean - the subject of envy among other dialogue partners. These coming years should have been the best time for Asean-China relations. Unfortunately, it will not be the case as some Asean countries have scores to settle with China.

From 1995 onwards, Asean and China have coexisted peacefully by putting the controversial disputes over the South China Sea on the backburner. In November 2002, after nearly a decade of effort, they signed the landmark document Declaration of Concerned Parties to the South China Sea, containing guidelines for claimants over the disputed areas. In the declaration, they pledged to increase their cooperation and find peaceful ways to resolve their conflict, including protection of marine environment, preventing transnational crimes, promoting safety of navigation and communication at sea in the disputed areas.

Now seven years have elapsed. No progress has been made as stipulated in the declaration. Since it is not a legally binding document, it would be difficult for any signatory to raise the issue. Asean, which has been frustrated with China's passive attitude towards the South China Sea, has kept quiet so far. Renewed attempts in the past four years to turn the declaration into a code of conduct have been unsuccessful.

However, during these intermittent years, bilateral arrangements for exploration proliferated between China and claimants such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia.

But there were hiccups when Asean and China started to materialise and prioritise cooperative activities by working out a common guideline in resource-rich maritime territories.

China has proposed that prior to any Asean-China meeting on the South China Sea, there should be separate meetings among the four Asean claimants - Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines - followed by non-claimant members. Later on, the 10 Asean members will meet with China.

Asean has opposed the plan because the grouping prefers to speak as one - a common Asean guideline.

The disagreement has already prevented any future cooperation as envisaged in the declaration. Some Bangkok-based Asean diplomats believe China's unyielding positions indicate its toughening attitude against Asean.

Alternatively, the Asean members, especially among the claimants, have become more business-like. Beijing's proposal to convene an Asean-China defence ministerial meeting has received lukewarm support, albeit with the Asean chair's endorsement.

Furthermore, Asean has been recalcitrant about allowing China, which has shown a keen interest, to be the first nuclear power to accede to the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). This time around, Asean wishes to have all the big five sign SEANWFZ at the same time. Such an attitude has surprised Beijing, which is used to 'first-come, first-serve' treatments from Asean.

During the Thai chairmanship, the South China Sea disputes were not on top of the Asean agenda. However, when the new Asean chair, Vietnam, takes over in 73 days, the ongoing disputes could be raised and lead to the much-feared multilateralisation.

Within the Asean circle, Hanoi has made it known the disputes would be included in the agenda at Asean summits in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, in April and October 2010, respectively.

Beijing has learned valuable lessons from extensive engagements with Asean that the maritime territorial disputes would pit the grouping as a whole against China, as in the Mischief Reefs case. Settling regional littoral disputes is highly problematic due to the lack of fixed demarcation lines and the constant threat to use forces among the claimants. That explains why Beijing has increasingly paid more attention to the non-claimants. Asean insists the declaration is between the grouping and China.

The chill in Asean-China ties came when the regional dynamics continued to highlight the respective roles of the major powers.

China is no exception, particularly on the South China Sea conflict, the Burmese crisis and the Mekong sub-region. Any conflicts at sea or inertia over Burma would not bode well with China's burgeoning international roles and peaceful rise.

The Mekong subregion, which has always been under China's influence, has now opened up and soon will become a new area of contest. In August, the US surprisingly made an initiative linking the Mississippi and Mekong Rivers for future cooperation on managing water resources, through the US-Lower Mekong Ministerial Meeting.

Such unusual cooperation between authorities working for inland and international rivers has been viewed with suspicion by China - interpreting this as US intrusion to weaken its control in the subregion.

Beijing understands well new strategies towards Asean must be multilayered and sustainable going beyond the mere economic realm without a black hole in the South China Sea.

Furthermore, the Chinese policy-makers have to consider other major powers, especially the US, new Japan, India, Australia, and their readiness to engage Asean on the same level playing field that China has enjoyed - but without pebbles in their shoes.