TALEBANISATION OF PAKISTAN: Is it the end of the road?

Over time, however, they turned inwards and diverted their attention toward Pakistan. They vowed to establish a political and administrative domain that would have Islamist features similar to the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. They also have an ideological agenda of making their domain available to other movements that share their Islamist agenda. "Talebanisation", as a generic term, has since been used to define a combination of Pakistani Taleban's ideological and political ambitions.

SHIFT AGAINST TALEBAN

Initially, the anti-American cause to liberate Afghanistan from "foreign occupation" provided the Pakistani Taleban with a much-needed legitimacy amongst the local population. For many, the Pakistani Taleban represented a religious movement, not necessarily hostile to Pakistan and not necessarily an enemy of the people. Despite the deadly terrorist attacks carried out by the Pakistani Taleban across the country, the popular media was reluctant to call them "terrorists". Public sympathy and an apologetic attitude towards the Taleban and their ideology gave rise to expectations that the Pakistani version might transform into a socio-political movement like the Hizbollah in Lebanon.

However, in view of the Taleban-linked atrocities that unfolded since the rise of Talebanisation in 2004, the tide has turned. The Pakistani Taleban has not been able to maintain public support, which is essential to launch a mass movement. More and more Pakistanis, as well as the popular media, are becoming critical of them. They are now regularly being depicted in the media as terrorists. This loss of public support has significantly reduced the possibility of the Pakistani Taleban transforming into a socio-political movement.

What caused this shift? There is no one reason for the current failure of Talebanisation in Pakistan. A series of inter-related issues and events changed public opinion and created a hostile environment for the group to advance their ideological and political agenda.

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC BLUNDERS

Pakistan, with the help of the international community, has been battling the Taleban on both operational and ideological fronts since early 2004. A comprehensive strategy has been implemented by the Pakistani government to eliminate them as an effective fighting force, while addressing the material grievances in the Taleban areas. But more than anything, the Taleban's own tactical and strategic blunders cost them vital public support.

They have been using the brutal tactics of beheadings and suicide bombings, which were anathema to Pakistani society, and which allowed mainstream religious scholars to attack the religious legitimacy of such tactics. The frequent use and public display of these tactics failed to take into consideration the religious and social realities of Pakistan and the possible opposition to such tactics. Additionally, the shift in targeting by suicide bombers - from security forces to the general public - turned supporters into angry opponents.

Initially suicide attacks against the security forces were largely viewed as "justified" by a large segment of Pakistani society, because the Army and other law-enforcement agencies were wrongly perceived by the masses as mercenaries fighting the unpopular US war on Pakistani soil. That substantially changed when Islamist death squads started targeting public places, funerals and mosques. Even when the attacks were against "legitimate" targets, the bombings caused considerable "collateral damage" which wore down public support. It resulted in a huge strategic failure for the Taleban and their associates as they lost public sympathy for their cause.

Other incidents reinforced this strategic miscalculation. The assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto; attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the Marriott Hotel; the flogging of a 16-year-old girl in Swat; and the killings of leading religious scholars like Maualana Hasan Jan and Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi; all served to undermine the Taleban's standing. The public understood that the Pakistani Taleban wanted nothing less than to capture the whole of Pakistan in order to create a cloak of religious zealotry.

People have seen the savagery with which the Taleban have treated innocent Pakistanis. Between 2003 and 2008 the casualties in Taleban-related violence numbered more than 20,000, including civilians and security personnel. In the 1965 war with its traditional rival India, Pakistani casualties stood at 4,000. For these reasons, there is an emerging consensus in Pakistan that the internal threat posed by Taleban is far greater than any external threat.

INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION

The above blunders are surmountable, but the strategic objective of creating a mass movement capable of taking power in Pakistan seems increasingly remote - even more so given the fragmented nature of the Pakistani Taleban. Unlike the Afghan Taleban, the Pakistani group is not a monolithic entity. The Pakistani Taleban is divided into various groups though they are nominally under the Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan (TTP) umbrella. Sectarian issues, geographic divisions, tribal politics as well as the fierce independence adhered to by the various factions suggest that there is little chance the TTP can take power.

Victory, as remote as that seems, would take on the appearance of pre-Taleban Afghanistan. Disunity within the group does not diminish the threat. A fragmented Taleban would always pose a serious threat by creating more chaos and instability in the country but they might not be able to win the hearts and minds of common Pakistanis.

It is assessed that the Pakistani Taleban have lost the capacity for mass mobilisation and to advance as an insurgent movement. In fact the Pakistani Taleban have evolved from a movement into a terrorist group with declining public support in Pakistan.

Khuram Iqbal is a senior research analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He conducted a field trip to Pakistan in July to study the prospect of Talebanisation in South Punjab. He was previously a senior researcher with the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad.