America's political clout is rising in Asean

Beijing and New Delhi must be scratching their heads now trying to figure out how to respond to the US's strong overture into the Asean landscape, as never before seen. Doing nothing, on the part of India, is no longer an option. Protecting Burma at every twist and turn of events will not serve China's best interest. Recently, the zero-sum game between the two Asian giants maintained the status quo of dynamics in Burma. Since last week, the US has injected something new into the equation of power here. Burma is sending signals that it now realises it could not and should not isolate itself and rely on Beijing's support and protection exclusively. A once passive India will also see an opening to craft its own strategy, independent of China's posturing over Burma. Rangoon still ignores the Asean appeal on Aung San Suu Kyi's pardon with its strong objections from Laos and Brunei.

One attribute in understanding the latest development was the US accession to the 33-year-old Treaty of Amity of Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in Phuket last month. Two quite stark perspectives between Burma and the US must be discerned. From the Burmese junta leaders' viewpoint, the US signatory would compel Washington to be more mindful of the principles enshrined in the TAC, in particular mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Since its admission to Asean, Burma has frequently invoked these principles to shield itself from peer and external pressure.

From Washington, however, joining the treaty has a different take. Like the other 26 signatories, the US can still continue with its position on human rights and level criticism against Burma - just like the good old days. What is more important for the US is the enhancement of its strategic interest and stronghold in this diverse region after the grouping was founded in 1967. Gone were the days the US was often accused of imposing its regional security designs to serve its own global ambition. Accepting an indigenous code of conduct of 10-member countries—pawns during the Cold War - proved a hefty US burden to come to terms with—altogether 17 years in the making. Indeed, the signatory gave value-added to the visits of US State Secretary Hillary Clinton and Virginia's Senator Jim Webb as well as their Burmese overtures. Upcoming reviews on US policy on Burma would certainly contain new elements regarding sanctions and future terms of engagement. What prevails next would also impact on the US role on Burma and its overall ties with Asean. And how the junta leaders choose to play Suu Kyi's freedom and upcoming election with Washington would soon be known. It could also define the new political parameter of US involvement in regional issues.

To understand the current US position in Asean, one needs to scrutinise the evolution of TAC. When Asean first approached all members of the UN Security Council after the Singapore Summit in 1992, the diplomats from US and dialogue partners represented at the summit were a bit bewildered. At the time, Asean and dialogue partners began to discuss the establishment of a multilateral security forum, which later became the Asean Regional Forum. In September of that year, the TAC became the first Asean treaty to be endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, none of the UNSC members have seriously studied the indigenous regional codes of conduct.

China did - and signed the TAC in 2003 after eight years of affirmative posturing. Throughout the 1995-2003 period, following the Mischief Reef incidents, Beijing painstakingly built up confidence among Asean members through the TAC—literally from zero to hero. That kind of level playing field was unprecedented for any major power, let alone China, which was still considered an arch-enemy in the early 1990s. India joined China as the first two nuclear powers to accede to the TAC. Then, the floodgate opened. Now Asean has a big headache concerning the ulterior motives of new signatories (Indonesia blocked Turkey's TAC accession in Phuket). Truth be told, Asean originally wanted the international community to accept TAC but later on aimed at the big five nuclear powers—which mattered the most to Asean peace and security. That has been achieved. At present, Asean is no longer in a rush to get individual nuclear powers to sign on to the 1995 no-nuke treaty—known as South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). China was supposed to be the first to do so this year but Asean has since deferred such efforts. Asean wants all the big five to sign it at the same time to avoid so-called preferential treatment - something which used to be Beijing's purview. The Obama Administration has already shown its willingness to accede to SEANWFZ with some reservations pending further negotiations between the US and its allies and friends in Asean.

The US signature also provides much needed closure to the frequently asked question about whether the US remains interested in the region. Now with the hands of the world's superpower untied by regional conduct, Washington is already waving and shaking delightfully. In months to come, the US will certainly have more regional initiatives regarding the Asean Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Asia Pacific Economic Community and other bilateral endeavours. Later this year, the US will become the first country to announce its first Asean-in-residence ambassador, outshining all the 28 countries that have already attached their Jakarta-based envoys to Asean. With the US presence in Jakarta at full throttle, Asean needs to commensurate and shape up—an eagle is nesting among the paddy stalks.

But one thing is still missing. For the three-decade old Asean-US relations and US political clout to prosper in a sustained manner, extraordinary efforts from Asean and US leaders are still needed to push for the institutionalisation of the summit level meeting. In the past, they did meet for a few times; they piggybacked on other summits, but never exclusively on their own. Past attempts proved to be elusive. Under this circumstance, the role of Asean chair is pivotal to materialise this long-held plan. When Filipino President Gloria Arroyo visited Washington recently, she urged US President Barack Obama to meet with the Asean leaders. The Philippines is the new US-Asean coordinator. At the Phuket meeting, Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan received strong words of support from Clinton on the proposed summit. Last week, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva accepted US President Barack Obama's invitation as the Asean chair to attend the Pittsburg G20 summit on September 24 and 25 in the US. He will again join Indonesia, the only Asean member of G20, and the rest of Asean plus six members (Australia, India, Japan, China, South Korea). Like the prime minister did in the London G-20 summit in April, Abhisit must impress on the host, Obama, that Asean is no longer a faceless entity but a rising international actor capable of contributing to the recovery of current global financial crisis.

(The author wishes to express deep gratitude to well-wishers for his speedy recovery. His column returns this week.)