An Asia-Aacific community and the future of Asean security

Using the template of Canberra's past three decades of successful contributions to the region, Rudd was confident that his brainchild would fly sky-high and in the not so distant future would lay the foundation of a new regional security architecture. Like his predecessors - former premiers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating - he hopes the APC plan would be his legacy. After all, the Labor Party is a brand name in Asean, not to mention Australia was the grouping's first dialogue partner in 1974.

Now after months of flying trial balloons and broad consultations with Asean and its major dialogue partners all over the world, Richard Woolcott, the special envoy appointed by Rudd, will soon come out with a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the APC, taking into consideration all views. This is a time for further reflection.

For any new idea in the region to take root, it requires a reasonable leading time. Any country that tries to thrust any idea on Asean and expects a warm reception will probably return home empty-handed. As an organisation, Asean is suspicious of new ideas, even a good one, as its members have their own mindsets. They value, and are not reluctant to invoke the two most effective ammunitions, consensus decision-making and non-interference principle - whenever they feel their cohesiveness being challenged from within and outside. They would collectively shout out loud and gradually turn inward to protect themselves.

In 1995, as host of the 5th Asean summit, Thailand had proposed the Asean People's Assembly meeting, which was a grand idea at the time. Although the plan was quickly shot down, the ideal has since lived on.

The concept has since morphed into different kinds of forums, which have in effect augmented further engagements of non-state actors. The Asean leaders took exactly 10 years to have the kind of confidence to listen to the representatives of civil society organisations.

Thanks to Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, the dialogue between Asean and civil society leaders started in earnest in December 2005 and continues today. The rumbling at the Cha-am-Hua Hin summit over the choice of civil society representatives was a good case in point. When some of the Asean leaders felt threatened by unrecognised civil society representatives, they threatened to boycott the meeting.

Now, the whole process is in jeopardy as some of the Asean leaders thought the interface process has gone too far and too fast, which could lead to the cancellation of the much-publicised dialogue at the upcoming 15thAsean Summit in October.

Before the region-wide security forum, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) was accepted by Asean and its dialogue partners, and it took quite a few years in preparation. Before the ARF plan took hold, Japan and the US had to lay the groundwork for discussion over two years.

Even Asean and its dialogue partners agreed on the framework, the ARF discussion continued to be bogged down due to dispute over the name -Asian Regional Forum or Asean Regional Forum. After some tense debate, the latter prevailed. Now 17 members of the 27-member ARF are non-Asean members. It is more Asia than Asean.

If there is no consensus among the Asean members, they would settle for the lowest common denominator even if it does not make sense. For example, the Asean Human Rights Body has now become the official name for the time being.

Proposed ideas by some Asean members and civil groups to establish a human rights commission or council or any other form that potentially would take away the members' national sovereignty would be immediately rejected.

In the case of the Asean Plus Three, it took almost six continuous years of debate and politicking before everybody agreed on the current forum back in 1997.

It took nearly a decade of evolution of the Asean Plus Three process to reach the current Asean Plus Six, officially known as the East Asia Summit (EAS), in 2005. Even today, Asean is still struggling to take the leading role in these two processes. Obviously, Asean has bitten off more than it can chew.

With such preponderance coupling with the Asean well-entrenched mindset, Australia must be patient enough to hang on to the idea.

If it is doable and necessary, as Rudd and Foreign Minister Stephen Smith would have us believe, then Asean and countries in the region are bound to associate themselves with it albeit later than sooner.

For now, they will probably rely on the ARF and its current effort to review and accelerate its cooperation and move towards preventive diplomacy and better still conflict resolution. If such effort fails, especially during the Thai chair, the APC would have a second chance

Judging from Rudd's leadership style and intellect, he is aiming for a bigger level playing field. Asean is too small a forum for Rudd's political ambition. From his Singapore Lecture, one can sense that he values Asean as a successful organisation in its own right. But the future challenges that the region would be facing such as new strategic, economic and military influence and alliances, climate changes, proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism as well as infectious diseases, would need a new form of comprehensive cooperation to tackle efficiently.

Of course, Asean will be a part of this effort. However, in this new set-up - make no mistake - Asean is not going to be pulling the strings. In other words, Asean has to earn its leading role, it is no longer a given.

Apparently, Rudd is not in the mood to liaise with his predecessor's success in signing the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2005, which led to Australia becoming one of the EAS founding members.

Even though Rudd would make Australia the most Asia-literate country in the collective West during his tenure, his mind is unmistakably with the bigger Asian players, not Asean as it is currently.