Thailand must Learn from other nations about the South

The absence of claims for the attacks has also lent itself to multiple interpretations of the violence, as seen in the wide range of explanations offered by Thai and foreign scholars, security analysts and terrorism specialists.

Since the turn of the 20th century, several nationalist and military administrations of Thailand have instituted measures that sought to assimilate the Malay-Muslim provinces into the wider geo-political body.

Local Malays in the deep South, often referred to as Patani Malays, resist these attempts because they feel that their cultural and religious identity is at stake. Like the Thais, the Patani Malays are immensely proud of their institutions, way of life and their place in the Malay-speaking world, which stretches from southern Thailand to the southern Philippines.

Armed separatism peaked in the late-1970s and early 1980s, endorsed and supported both by leaders and governments in the Middle East, who provided financial aid, training, and ultimately, refuge, for the mushrooming Patani diaspora.

In the late 1980s these armed movements began to crumble, partly due to Thailand's counter-insurgency strategy, known as tai rom yen, and partly because the gap between combatants on the ground and the leaders abroad was getting wider.

The Thai state mistakenly assumed that the absence of violence meant peace, thinking that massive development, coupled with good intent, was enough to reconcile the historical mistrust between the region and the state.

There is a general tendency to see this problem as an internal, domestic matter for Thailand. In many respects, this is true. But the Westphalian concept of a nation-state has its limitations. But then again, who would dare say that the political borders that cut through communities are a mistake. The best anybody can do, it seems, is try to come to terms with it.

The question is how.

It is my sincere belief that most of the Patani Malays residing in the three southernmost provinces do not want to separate from Thailand. I believe they want to be part of the country, but in their own terms. Their way of life and their Malay identity, as opposed to the nationally constructed "Thai identity", is not up for compromise.

In this globalised world, with the flow of information travelling at the speed of light over the Internet, and the fact of the high level of religiosity among Muslim communities throughout the world, the Thai state must find a better way to engage the world and explain its official policies.

It needs to go beyond just blaming misguided youths who have been taught "distorted" history and the "wrong" brand of Islam.

If the Thai state chooses this route, it will have to prepare to debate its legitimacy in the Malay historical homeland. Indeed, the narrative of the local community that sees the Thai state as an occupying force is a far cry from the official version.

The latest warning to Bangkok that the world is watching came in the form of a damning report from London-based Amnesty International about the use of torture by Thai security forces on detained suspects.

AI also suggested that countries with military ties use their influence to get the Thai security forces to end what appears to be the systematic ill treatment of suspects.

Remember that Thailand is a signatory to the UN Convention Against the Use of Torture, as well as other conventions that require troops to respect and uphold human rights principles.

If you look around the region, - Mindanao, Burma, Aceh and Papua New Guinea - separatist movements and insurgencies are not uncommon. With the exception of Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia, governments have also permitted other countries and NGOs to take part in the mediation process.

In fact, last year the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his effort in mediating the conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the government of Indonesia. Thailand can and should learn from the experience of our neighbours.

Besides engaging the international community, the government will have to come up with a common understanding, a sound policy, as to how it will handle sensitive issues, such as talking to the insurgents on the ground and the long-standing separatist groups in exile.

Since the Thaksin administration's first term, there have been attempts by various agencies, with and without government endorsement, to enter into some sort of dialogue with various separatist movements.

None of these initiatives can be considered as successful, partly because they were carried out without a proper mandate from the government and partly because the Thai officials were not talking to the right people.

Some of these exiled groups, on the other hand, are said to be moving towards formulating a common platform as to how to deal with the Thai state when the opportunity arises. The extent of their ability to influence the new generation of militants on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The current administration of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is formating a comprehensive policy for the deep South. But much of it is centred on structural reform and adjustments in the division of labour.

It is my hope that the government goes beyond that and looks at other examples mentioned earlier and formulates a better policy and strategy as to how the international community, as well as the separatist organisations, should be engaged.