The election prospects of the Democrat Party

At the December 23, 2007 polls, the Democrats lost decisively to the People Power Party (PPP), yet they still scored their second-best election result ever, taking 164 of the 480 seats, just over a third.

Only in 1976 did they win a larger proportion (114 of 279). At the 1992 poll, the last time an election led to a Democrat-headed government, they won less than a quarter.

How did the Democrats do so well in 2007?

Perhaps the most startling result was on the party list, the 80 seats decided on a vote by party. Nationwide, the Democrats trailed PPP by only 190,399 votes, and won only one fewer seat (33 against 34). At the 2001 and 2005 polls, the Democrats had won only a little over 7 million each time, and had trailed TRT by a mile. This time, both parties gained a little over 12 million votes.

How did the Democrats do so much better?

Several voters picked a minor party on the constituency vote, but then plumped for one of the two big parties (Democrats or PPP) on the party list. Possibly they made their constituency choice for "local" reasons (they liked the candidate) but their party list choice for "national" reasons (for or against Thaksin). The same thing had happened at the 2001 and 2005 polls. But this time many more people (around 15 per cent of voters) switched from small parties at the constituency vote to the two big parties at the party-list. And two out of three of these shifters moved to the Democrats, only one to PPP. That was what gave the Democrats their superior showing on the party-list poll. The shift to the Democrats was especially strong in the lower north, east, and central regions.

This shift has a clear implication: if the Democrats had some better candidates, they ought to do better in the constituencies.

But where?

The two main parties now have an electoral heartland. The TRT/PPP has the upper north and the core northeast. The Democrats have the south (excluding the Malay-Muslim far south). Over the last three polls, this geographical division has become clearer and deeper. In these heartlands, the opponent is nowhere. In the northeast, the Democrats gained a pitiful 8 per cent of the votes in the constituency polls.

By contrast to these heartlands, the lower north and central regions have become an electoral checkerboard. Several 3-member constituencies returned MPs from two or three parties. Neighbouring areas voted in completely different ways. In the Chao Phya plain from the hill fringe down to the sea, voters have reverted to the old pattern of selecting candidates on local grounds with less attention to party. This is where the Democrats have to fish for opportunities.

The return to multi-member voting has produced many more close contests. At the 2001 and 2005 polls, most winners won by a mile. The multi-member format with more parties has fragmented the vote. In several constituencies, the winners gained only 30-odd per cent, and rivals were hot on their heels.

If only 1 per cent of voters voted differently, 11 seats could change hands. A 5 per cent shift could change a total of 60 seats, and a 10 per cent shift could change 104. Many of these "marginal" seats are in the checkerboard region of the centre and lower north. These have to be the Democrats' targets at the next poll.

But what chance do they have?

Let's suppose that all the seats that are vulnerable to small shifts by the voters do indeed change hands.

If there is a 1 per cent shift, the Democrats end up with three more seats, two won from PPP and one from a small party. If there is a 5 per cent shift, the PPP loses 23 seats, and the Democrats gain 18. That would be enough to give the Democrats the chance of heading a coalition. But it's not that simple. There are also seats where the Democrats won narrowly in 2007 and are vulnerable to a slight shift in voting. They would gain 18 seats but lose 14 elsewhere. The net result would be that the PPP lose 9 seats while the Democrats gain 4 and other parties gain the other 5. If there is a 10 per cent shift in voting, the result is even more ambiguous. PPP loses 20 seats, but the Democrats gain only 3.

This is just a statistical exercise with not much bearing on reality. But what it shows is that small shifts in voting could change the result in contradictory ways. The Democrats have a good chance of winning some. But in others, especially in Bangkok and the east where the Democrats gained ground in 2007, the Democrats themselves are vulnerable.

Consider Chonburi and Rayong, the political fiefdom of Kamnan Poh. In 2005, Kamnan Poh delivered all the seats to TRT. But by 2007, Kamnan Poh had fled the country to avoid sentencing, and the Democrats won all the seats. Local opinion reckons there were two factors behind this astonishing swing: Poh's sons did not pay enough attention, and the large number of army and navy personnel in the area were mobilised to oust PPP. At provincial and municipal elections only a few months later, the Poh family candidates won by a mile. The family was paying attention and the military was not a factor.

The Democrats have a chance to win at the polls rather than by another "accident." But it won't be easy. At the 2007 poll, a lot of public money and public resources were mobilised behind the attempt to prevent a

 PPP victory. How much this benefited the Democrats is impossible to gauge. And how far it will be a factor at the next poll is unknown.