Fairer share of the spoils vital

Solving the ongoing political crisis and defeating the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) will entail creating expectations for a fair share of Thailand's economic wealth.

Economic concerns are probably the most important factor that led to the lifting the state of emergency for Bangkok and the dumping of ex-premier Samak Sundaravej.

After Samak imposed the state of emergency, the business community and several civic groups launched a campaign for its revocation and issued a plea for a peaceful solution.

Business leaders pointed to negative effects on the tourism industry, one of the main sources of Thailand's revenue and employment. They also warned persistent political turmoil could hurt all economic sectors.

Even those considering themselves part of the "silent majority" joined the fray, strongly expressing their opposition to the Samak government and blaming the PAD for organising protests that grew out of hand.

The next government, even though it will likely consist of old, familiar faces, can improve the situation if it is able to convince people it will work for everyone's benefit. Mismanagement of the macroeconomy since the government of ousted PM Thaksin Shinawatra is a key cause of the instability, one the new government must carefully examine and correct.

Fair competition among businesses was lacking under the Thaksin administration. Those closely connected to him and the ruling party enjoyed the lion's share of growth. Some large firms forced the Finance Ministry to design tax policies or introduce biased tax-collection practices benefiting certain tycoons.

This is why several businesses helped fund the PAD' s campaign to topple Thaksin.

Trying to weaken political and economic institutions whose role is to guarantee fair treatment socially or economically is what started the conflict. Thaksin's meddling in the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Constitution Court and the Election Commission raised widespread fears among the public about poor governance.

Samak's Cabinet wanted to continue meddling in these independent organisations through constitutional amendments.

Murky supervision of state enterprises was another source of conflict. Each government seems to exploit these enterprises by assigning its supporters or cronies to sit on their boards, enabling these appointees to make a lot of money, a practice that prompted state-enterprise workers to join the protest.

The government promoting big business in ways that take advantage of local people is another unresolved issue.

Non-governmental organisations and local people have long campaigned for the right of Thais to manage their natural resources. Their struggles have not yet been fully recognised by any government, let alone the Thaksin administration.

Unhappy citizens may be much fewer in number than rural residents who like populist polices and are pro-government, but they still add up to a lot of anti-government protesters.

The Samak government did not make it clear how good economic policies would in the long run replace controversial populist policies viewed by the middle class as a waste of public money for the ruling party's short-term political popularity.

Samak's two economic packages failed to address past mismanagement of macroeconomic policies. Indeed, Finance Minister Surapong Suebwonglee performed poorly in the eyes of critics who accused him of meddling in the key economic regulators: the Bank of Thailand, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Revenue Department.

Samak's actions - and inaction - reinforced fears of poor governance and unfair business treatment. This is why businesses continued to channel funds to protesters, keeping the PAD's support base strong.

The next government must create expectations of better governance by guaranteeing fair treatment and a fair share of the Kingdom's wealth. If it can do this successfully, it can weaken the PAD's campaign and ultimately end the confrontation.