• 
• 

As some events and views were incorrectly reported, please allow me to clarify them for the record:

1) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) pointed out that if we Thais had believed the demarcation at Preah Vihear area to be incorrect, we should have raised this issue with the French when Annex I was made. We could have also done this in 1927 and 1937 when we were negotiating the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.

In fact, when we produced a map of our own in 1937, Preah Vihear was shown to be in Cambodian territory. In 1946 when we were finalising the transfer of the four Laotian and Cambodian provinces to France, we could have objected at the Conciliation Commission. But in all three instances we did not do so.

2) According to the ICJ, the Thai delegation, in its negotiations with Cambodia in 1958, used language to indicate that Thailand had been in possession of Preah Vihear only from 1941 when the Treaty of Tokyo came into force.

3) As to our reacquisition in 1941, as a result of the Tokyo Treaty, of the four provinces of Battabong, Siemraj (which included Preah Vihear), Champasak, and Lanchang, which we were forced to cede to the French imperialists in Ror Sor 112 (1836), both finance minister Pridi Bhanomyong and prime minister Plaek Pibulsonggram agreed that they belonged and should be returned to Thailand. Prior to the Tokyo agreement, Pridi had advised Plaek to recover them by legal and peaceful means via the ICJ. But Plaek, because of his secret agreement with Japan, wanted to use military means. Pridi tried to convince him that we had a good chance of winning the case because the four provinces comprised a former Thai protectorate ceded to France, but France was no longer in a position to "protect" them after her surrender to Germany and her total helplessness towards Japan. When Japan and Plaek lost WWII, the "status quo" policy advocated by the Allies forced Thailand to return the provinces to France. We also complied with this policy to prevent France from vetoing our application for UN membership in 1946.

4) When Cambodia became independent in 1953, we reoccupied Preah Vihear Temple. Cambodia wrote letters to us on the status of Preah Vihear, but we did not reply. Ambassador Sompong Sucharitkul told us on TV that Cambodia offered to share ownership with Thailand, but we disagreed.

Cambodia also broke diplomatic relations with us during this period. The country took us to the ICJ in 1958 and won in 1962. The ICJ made a number of decisions including that Cambodia had "territorial sovereignty" over Preah Vihear Temple. The ICJ was not clear on the boundary between the two countries, as this specific question was not posed to the court. We made our reservation on this judgement to recover Preah Vihear.

5) Lastly on the options facing us on Thai-Cambodian border conflicts, I pointed out that in the past our conflicts with Cambodia were much more serious, and Cambodia had broken diplomatic relations with us. We also did not have Asean at that time. So we both agreed to use the "good offices" of the UN secretary-general. The present border problem has hardly reached the level it did during the first Preah Vihear "crisis". So I certainly could not advocate using the UN mechanism, at least at this time.

Also, since the ICJ in its ruling of 1962 interpreted our lack of an objection to Annex I between 1907 to 1958 as indicative of our acceptance that Preah Vihear Temple was in Cambodian territory, it would be unwise to go to the ICJ again unless there were new ideas on settling boundary issues. In any case, I also observed that after our loss in 1962, we must have terminated our renewal of ICJ's jurisdiction on our country. But this point has to be confirmed by our Foreign Ministry, which is still mute on this subject.

Asda Jayanama

Bangkok