
They gave two reasons for the impatience on the part of Washington: Islamabad had failed to disrupt the militants' training camps and cross-border attacks; and it had shown hesitation to launch joint operations in the area.
Hundreds of Pakistani citizens have fallen victim to terrorist attacks, particularly suicide attacks, and more Pakistani security personnel have died fighting militants than from the US-led coalition. Learning from the bitter experience of the past that an indiscriminate use of force in the tribal area boosts militancy instead of bringing it under control, the coalition government decided to deal with it through the time-tested tribal methods of conflict resolution. Al-Qaeda is not limited to Pakistan's tribal areas alone. Threats from it can emanate from Iraq, Afghanistan or even Algeria. Hot pursuit into Pakistan is likely to add to the US's difficulties, besides posing a threat to the coalition government, and in the process causing irrevocable harm to the democratic process. The US-led coalition conducting operations inside Afghanistan would do well to benefit from Pakistan's experience and employ a holistic strategy to pacify the militants.