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If you are a soccer fan, you may consider the analogy, representing the past week, of an exhilarating period of a game in which the judiciary team scores three goals in rapid succession, say, from the 70th to 80th minutes. In other words, the Thaksin camp has ten minutes to equalise. It's a back-to-the-wall situation where, in soccer, you are as likely to concede more goals as to get one or two back.

The Administrative Court's injunction on the government's Preah Vihear resolution and the Supreme Court's clampdown on Thaksin's legal team for alleged contempt were the first blows that put the duo on the back foot. It was the third goal, however, that did the real damage. The Constitution Court's endorsement of the Assets Examination Committee's threatened legitimacy is by no means the last nail in Thaksin's coffin, but it is surely delivered by a solid hammer.

The irony has come full circle for the Constitution Court. It acquitted Thaksin, in 2001, of assets concealment, apparently against the will of the 1997 charter, hailed as one of the best and democratic in Thai history. Now the same court, albeit with different judges, has endorsed a coup-installed committee set up by a much-maligned military junta and supported by a controversial new Constitution to investigate what other democratic checks and balances mechanisms could not.

In 2001, the democratic Constitution Court virtually set the stage for Thailand's biggest and most divisive political crisis. Now, the same court is probably helping to bring the curtain down on a prolonged infamy that it played a big part in triggering. There are many possible end scenarios to the Thai crisis, but it would be best to have Dr Frankenstein kill his monster.

The Ratchadapisek land case now looms as the final "nail". We don't need to look further than the Bt2 million "gift" that Thaksin's defence team tried to give to Supreme Court officials to see how much the case has worried his lawyers. Solid evidence - Thaksin's own consent to be exact - has linked him inseparably to his wife's purchase of the state-auctioned plot of land. The defence, therefore, has been left with the only choice of disputing the charge that the auction was a governmental activity supervised by Thaksin.

Let's put it this way: Thaksin's defence, reeling from the "pastrygate" scandal, will have to prove to the Supreme Court that the former prime minister, who could fire the then finance minister, who in turn could fire the then Bank of Thailand governor, who oversaw the Financial Institutions Development Fund, which put the specific land on auction as state assets, had no control or influence whatsoever over the whole bidding process.

What is the significance of the "first goal"?

Has pastrygate and the Constitution Court's support for the AEC overshadowed the Administrative Court's resolution injunction on Preah Vihear Temple? Not quite. Look at it closely and it's a ruling that not only embarrassed a government perceived widely as a Thaksin nominee, but also killed off any chances it still had for pushing any suspicious agenda.

The Samak administration has been softened up in Parliament. The Administrative Court helped solidify the opposition's case on the temple, leaving the government's image badly bruised. This ensures that - unless Samak becomes completely suicidal - contentious charter amendment proposals that could get Thaksin out of this jam will never be revived in the foreseeable future. In other words, if the Samak government could not change the charter when it was still relatively popular, it cannot dream about that now.

But the most intriguing thing about Samak is that he could be better off being bad. A popular, sweet-talking Samak with efficient economic management could have got away with dubious constitutional amendments - but his days could be immediately numbered if charter changes were effected to pave the way for Thaksin's return. On the other hand, a moody, toxic-tongued prime minister failing on most fronts could at least curse his way into a second year, when Parliament again is allowed to censure him.

This brings us to the much-taunted yet die-hard theory that Thaksin chose the wrong man to engineer his return to power. That man has left what was once proclaimed as his number one objective - to give Thaksin justice - in tatters, and instead appears more than eager to overstay his welcome. And with the censure debate out of the way, Samak has regained his most formidable leverage, the power to dissolve the House of Representatives and send both friends and enemies alike back to square one.

Of course, after the past few tumultuous days, it's looking really bad for both Thaksin and Samak. The only difference is, while the former must be cringing, the latter may be somewhat loving it.