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Their mission was to arrest Hambali, a key member of Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, who was hiding on the fifth floor of a road-front building. They did it - and within 24 hours, the region's most wanted terrorist was whisked away to an unknown location outside Thailand as part of the now infamous rendition programme.

The arrest came after two months of a much publicised visit by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to Washington. During the informal meeting with US President George Bush in June, Thaksin stressed Thailand's eagerness, as one of the US's oldest treaty allies, to cooperate with the US-led global counter-terrorism.

After some recalcitrance over the wars in Afghanistan and earlier on in Iraq, in which Thaksin professed Thailand's neutrality, the meeting was a god-send and immediately turned Thailand into a leading partner in the region -along with Singapore and the Philippines-which was called a second front on the war on terror.

Thaksin offered Thailand as a logistics base for the American troops fighting in the two countries. Also, Thailand became the first Asian country to commit troops on the ground to help the US in the reconstruction efforts in Karbala, central Iraq, as part of the coalition of the willing. However, with two Thai soldiers killed in car bombings and growing criticism at home, the first contingent of Thai troops was pulled out in September 2004, after a year of non-combat field operations. Until now, the government has failed to keep its pledge to send in the second batch.

Thaksin returned triumphantly to Bangkok with hefty rewards from the US. Thailand was accorded a major non-Nato ally and received the green light from Bush on the fast-track negotiations of the Thai-US free trade agreement, which proceeded in earnest not long after his trip. After almost two years of painstaking negotiations, the process collapsed in 2006 over disputes on intellectual property rights and growing domestic discontentment from the lack of transparency.

Thai-US cooperation on terrorism as part of the global war on terror increased markedly with the US providing training and sophisticated equipment to trace and monitor the movements of suspected terrorists. The intensive intelligence exchanges between the two countries helped to prevent Thailand from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, as it once was preceding the September 11 attacks in the US.

Internationally, Thailand has implemented various UN resolutions on anti-terrorist instruments, especially the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Locally, Thailand also has come out with action plans to suppress terrorist financing, especially that across the southern border. The Committee of Counter-International Terrorism, chaired by the prime minister, and the Counter International Terrorist Operation, were set up and remain as the two main bodies to coordinate and implement policies on counter-terrorism.

Within the region, Thailand joined other Asean members in intelligence exchanges and signed several bilateral agreements to improve the effectiveness of combating terrorist financing and suppression. Bangkok signed the Asean Convention on Counter Terrorism in early 2007. Gone were the days when Thailand's cooperation on terror with foreign countries, especially the US, was fuelled by leaders' enthusiasm. Thaksin's own self-interest drove Thailand to actively participate in the global counter terrorism. Therefore, attempts were made to link the violence in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani to the so-called global jihadists. From 2003-06, several senior Thai officials made numerous but unsubstantiated claims that the insurgents in the south had links with radical groups abroad such as Jemaah Islamiah, al-Qaeda as well as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-islami. The arms heist in Narathiwat on January 4, 2004 was a wake-up call concerning troubles in the south, as it showed the complexities of players and issues involved.

Subsequent investigations did not yield many results because the authorities were not able to identify various suspects allegedly involved with remnants of radical Muslim groups such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional or Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani, various criminal gangs in drug-trafficking and gun-running, corrupt security officials, among others.  

Four years have elapsed with more than 3000 civilians killed and the level of violence continues, but the authorities are confident that the southern situation can be contained and managed. In particular, Army Chief General Anupong Paochinda has said he believed he could achieve this objective within two years through hard and soft approaches involving more efficient internal security management and viable social and economic packages.

Under his leadership, troop levels have surged to almost 65,000, allowing them to set up tighter security grids in the three provinces. The operations have been quite effective in restricting militants' movements. With better intelligence collection and utilisation (aided by newly installed CCTVs), post-attack investigative capabilities and better financial incentives, numerous planned attacks have been foiled.

As part of the soft approach, respect for human rights and improved socio-cultural condition are also top priorities in the war to win hearts and minds. The ongoing investigation of Yapa Koseng's death in March will be the ultimate test case of the central authority's sincerity and sense of justice. If the culprit remains free for whatever reasons, liken the case to that of Muslim lawyer Somchai Neeraphaijit, Anupong's whole approach would be fruitless.

Of late, international concerns over the violence in southern Thailand have increased, following revelations that al-Queda-related groups have been able to regenerate and become active again. Even though they have been unable to attack mainland US since 2001, they have complicated American interests overseas and those of its allies in trouble spots around the world, including southern Thailand.

The recent capture of militant training camps along the Thai-Malaysian border has worried Thai security forces that some form of involvement with transnational terrorist groups has been established. But it has yet to be proved.

US counter-terrorist experts have expressed concern that if the situation in southern Thailand does not improve, it could be targeted for infiltration by al-Queda groups and its affiliates. They believe that existing inspiration and ideological linkages from outside could be further exploited and developed into active collaboration.