Australia's Foreign Policy: Rudd's paradox

Interestingly enough, Rudd continues to view East Asia in the old fashioned way: Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia as separate entities. Such an approach could become problematic for Australia's future engagement and partnership with Asean.

Leaders of the two regions met in 1997 for the first time in Kuala Lumpur to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Asean's formation. As the meeting came on the heels of the Asian financial crisis, the leaders agreed quite readily that their destinies and security were more intertwined than they ever imagined, or admitted.

That meeting gave birth to the Asean plus three process, which is currently underpinned by the institutional-building in the Asean-inspired East Asian community. They have met every year ever since and renewed their commitment. 

It is understandable why Rudd is proposing the idea of an Asia-Pacific Community at this particular time. At a personal level, the new Australian prime minister has been perceived as a China-focused leader. He wants to dismantle this image.

His trip to China in March, the first Asian country he officially visited, coupled with his own interest and language ability gave that strong impression. So, it marked Australia's new foreign policy priority towards Asia.

Obviously, his Asia Pacific Community will shift the debate to the other Asia - non-China Asia - which is the turf of Asian democracies, namely Japan and India. His much-awaited visit to Japan this week will allow him to reiterate the important role played by Asia's richest nation both in times of peace and crisis. To please the sensitive Japanese leaders, he could even said that the idea is a reintroduction of Tokyo's brainchild.

 Institutionally, Rudd wants to get rid of the current black hole in the region. It was twenty years ago that Australia proposed the establishment of Asia-Pacific-wide club, now known as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec). At the time, it was a great idea to promote trade and economic cooperation across the Pacific Ocean that encompassed the US and Pacific-Rim countries.

From the current perspective, the Apec framework remains a bit abnormal as countries have been treated as economies for political expediency rather than as countries with full sovereignty, making certain aspects of their collective cooperation almost impossible. Still, India, the newly emerging global power, is not a member. So far, progress has been slow and in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy, counter-terrorism cooperation and measures have dominated the usual trade agenda.

Details of Rudd's proposal need to be ironed out concerning the role and position of Asean. The envisaged regional group will combine China, Japan, India and Indonesia along with the US and Australia. He argued that Asia must go beyond the current mind-set and frameworks to create a more encompassing regional community that would be able to deal collectively with political, economic and security issues. In his view, existing cooperative regional frameworks such as the Asean Regional Forum, Asean Plus Three, East Asia Summit are insufficient.

For the countries outside Asean, the new community will have greater significance and augur well for the new collective challenges confronting the region. These issues, which no single country can cope with, are trans-border in nature such as climate change, counter-terrorism, security in energy and goods, not to mention a freer trading system. That much is clear.

Indeed, upon close scrutiny it is crystal clear what Rudd is driving at is a new regional architecture without the Asean centrality. In his reading, Asean is no longer perceived as a driving force in regional cooperation with a strategic environment.  After all, the regional frameworks Rudd mentioned were all linked to Asean. Each forum has its own unique, quite irritating problems.

For instance, the East Asian Summit or  Asean plus six is not considered as a community-building process - which is the privilege of Asean plus three - but rather a discussion forum. To put it in a light-hearted way, Australia is poised not to renew the grouping's driving licence. At this juncture, nobody knows how Indonesia - whether it is standing alone or on behalf of Asean - can fit into this new setting.

Perhaps, Rudd will use his visit to the Jakarta-based Asean Secretariat on Friday, as part of an official trip to Indonesia to magnify his vision related to Asean. Rudd has a lot to explain when he meets and hold talks with Asean Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan. As the second oldest dialogue partner of Asean since 1974, Australia, has occupied a special place in the annals of Asean's institutional and capacity building. AustAid has a representative office in the secretariat.

As the first leader from dialogue partners to stop over at the grouping's headquarters, he will make history. But he must quickly dispel any inkling in Asean that his perception is Euro-centric and condencending before it becomes an established fact. In a similar vein, Surin must convince Rudd that Asean is reinventing itself and is still relevant. Australia and Asean need each other's support for any viable regional scheme.

Rudd must avoid the pitfall of the Howard government, which came to power with a strong US-dominated foreign policy. Infamous comments on Australia's role as a deputy sheriff and rights for pre-emptive strikes unnecessarily harmed his standing in Asia. Tangible progress former prime minister John Howard accomplished related to his Asian policies including Asean in the latter half of his administration would have scored higher points and appreciation if not for the earlier hiccups.

At least for now, Rudd has no reasons to do a somersault regarding Australia foreign policy towards Asia while Canberra is enjoying excellent relations with Asean. It he does proceed with the idea, it could have a far-reaching repercussion on the region and could subsequently disrupt its creative middle power diplomacy.