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More than 3,200 people have been killed since January 2004.

The present situation in southern Thailand resembles what occurred in territories once controlled by Indonesia. Before the current autonomous administrative region in Aceh was created and before East Timor became an independent state, arbitrary arrests of suspected insurgents and harming them "with extreme prejudice" during interrogations was common in these areas.

As the situation on the ground deteriorated, affected civilians in conflict areas were given weapons and ammunitions to protect themselves and their communities. Subsequently, armed civilians became a problem, as it was difficult to control their actions and ensure that they used their arms lawfully and in good faith.

With growing abuses and violations of human rights, pressure from the international community, including Western countries and UN-related agencies, augmented and attracted all kinds of involvement from third parties wanting to assist in the peace process.

Interviews with officials stationed in the three provinces, including senior military officials familiar with the thinking of the Thai Army under Chief Anupong Paochinda's leadership, show a marked shift in strategies in managing the conflict zones, psychological warfare, intelligence-gathering and rules of engagement.

They realise that the Army's responses to the growing violence could eventually end up harming them and their security if they are not done "according to the rule of law" and in "a just way". They also understand well that without the support of local communities, every policy and action by the Army would be in vain.

For instance, one of the biggest problems facing the security forces is the high level of physical abuse when suspected insurgents and local residents are interrogated. The death of Imam Yapa Koseng, a 56-year-old Muslim religious leader arrested by the Army in March, is a good case in point. His body was badly bruised and burnt and his ribs were broken. As far as Anupong was concerned, it was the biggest public-relations disaster of his career.

When he rushed to visit the South after Yapa's death, he told Fourth Army Region staffers that the perpetrators would be seriously punished. A special committee, which was set up in March, will soon wrap up the investigation. A senior Army official who has knowledge of the ongoing investigation said that superiors responsible for those found guilty would be reprimanded as well.

The handling of Yapa's case will serve as a litmus test for determining whether the rule of law has been strictly observed in translating verbal commitments into actions by Thai security forces under Anupong's command. If he fails to deliver justice to Yapa's family and relatives as well as hundreds of similar victims, his long-term counter-insurgency activities in the South will be rendered fruitless. His dreams of seeing normalcy restored in the three provinces by the end of next year will remain elusive. Anupong and senior staffers are aware that their actions are being closely scrutinised by UN agencies and various international human-rights organisations concerned with ill-treatment and torture. Last year the Surayud government surprisingly ratified the UN Convention against Torture. The Army supported the move as it believed that doing so would help to boost the country's image and serve as a shield against outside criticism. They know they have to balance security concerns and the protection human rights. However, security forces in conflict zones have yet to understand the convention and follow through on it.

According to Anupong's aides, the absence of the rule of law and rights abuses in Aceh and East Timor among Indonesian security forces was pivotal in worsening the security situation there. They reiterated that Thai security forces, totalling a little over 60,000 troops, operating in the three provinces must not repeat such mistakes. Whenever a case of abuse occurs, it must be documented and backed up by evidence and eyewitnesses. The case must go through the due process of the law and justice must be done.

Obviously, for the Thai Army leaders, the emphasis on rule of law and justice is aimed at mitigating any future possible involvement of international players -formally or informally - in domestic conflict. They are not willing to engage a third party. The effectiveness of this approach will be evident sooner than later.

Unlike his predecessors, Anupong has so far avoided supporting official dialogue and negotiations with the militants operating in the three provinces. Any contact with the representatives of insurgents must be approved by the government, Army or the National Security Council. In the past three years, informal contact was made and dialogues were held through international mediators but without any tangible progress.

Another noticeable difference is in rhetoric. The word "samarn-chan" or "reconciliation", which is repeatedly used in domestic political debates, has been conspicuously absent in the past six months in describing the southern situation. In official Army documents, the terms "kabuan karn baeng yeak dindaen" (secessionist movement) and "jorn baeng yeak dindaen" (secessionist) are also completely missing. "Kloom koh kuam mai sa-ngom" or "groups that instigate unrest" is being used to describe the insurgents and militants.

It remains to be seen whether the violence in the South can be stopped given the dramatic increase in shootings and bombings there in recent weeks.