
The Nation
After years of approaching security matters in a lackadaisical and self-important fashion, they have only recently come to grips with the impact of fast-paced development related to the global strategic environment, particularly the impact of the six-party talks on the region. At issue is a move pushing for the six-party nuclear talks involving the US, China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas to be transformed into a permanent Northeast Asian mechanism focusing on regional security issues. The regionwide security forum would be more results-oriented than the ARF and take a no-nonsense approach to security matters.
The new forum would be called the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism and Russia is currently leading a working group studying the possibility of its formation. Russia is in favour of the mechanism and Japan, while mindful of Asean's concerns, is also supporting the idea of an additional regional security forum. Tokyo is seriously concerned by the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear programme to its national security.
However, establishing a new security framework would not be an easy matter. Differences among those participating in the six-party talks still exist and it would take time to bridge these gaps despite their keen enthusiasm. After all, North Korea has yet to fully comply with promises it made a year ago to disarm its nuclear machinery. Pyongyang's recalcitrance to provide a full account of its nuclear programme coupled with the disclosure last week of a link between the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Syria would further dampen the prospect of quickly establishing this planned security community.
The strong desire shown by six-party talk members for a new security forum will certainly drive Asean senior officials into action. The six-party talk members seem to know the Asean way of thinking and its herd mentality very well. Changes within the ARF are inevitable when it is being challenged head-on.
For instance, a decade ago, Asean decided to accelerate the establishment of its free-trade area only after it was clear that the bigger and broader Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation was going to liberalise its tariff and trade regime. It was a survival tactic. In a similar vein, there are a few things that Asean leaders can do right away to save the ARF.
First of all, the ARF needs a vision statement. So far, it doesn't have one. When the forum was established in 1994, it provided a means for foreign ministers to discuss security issues with the aim to establish a dispute-settlement mechanism. But the ARF has yet to move towards the level of preventive diplomacy and that is long overdue.
Secondly, the ARF process must focus on concrete and practical cooperation. There are too many confidence-building discussions that cover very broad issues without any specific purpose. For non-Asean ARF members, there has been too much talk over the past 14 years without any concrete action. It was only in 2006 that the ARF began to explore joint tabletop exercises in avian influenza and, only this year, that it began exercises in maritime security. To increase the ARF members' joint exercise manoeuvrability, they should conduct more live exercises deploying real assets.
It was a shame really for Asean because other younger organisations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), set up in 2002, have already conducted three biennial large-scale joint military exercises.
Thirdly, the ARF's decision-making process goes at a snail's pace. In a world prone to unpredictable political fluctuations, it is important to consider new processes to lessen the response time to a new crisis. On average, it takes a year at least for a proposal related to the intersessional level to be approved. At this point, it is pivotal to delegate decision-making on routine issues to ARF senior officials instead of the usual ministerial level. In addition, the ARF must be able to convene emergency meetings through an ad-referendum process coordinated by the ARF chair.
Fourthly, the forum is getting too big as many countries have applied to join the ARF. When it was formed in 1994, there were only 18 members. Now there are 27 members with outstanding applications from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Afghanistan. Some of these countries are interested in ongoing ARF activities, especially those related to counter-terrorism, disaster relief, and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Finally, Asean has to strengthen its role in the ARF process. It has to walk the walk and talk the talk to reaffirm the grouping's centrality. With the implementation of the new Asean Charter, the Asean secretary-general should have a role in the ARF, especially during emergencies. With a five-year tenure, he has continuous institutional knowledge and experience unlike the ARF chair who changes every year. It would also fit in very well with the planned Asean Security Community which is less than eight years away.
Strengthening the Asean Unit within the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta is also imperative as it lacks the intellectual capacity to identify future challenges or prepare strategic and security blueprints in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, Asean members must be willing to contribute more both in terms of funding and other forms of assets. For a healthy start, Asean should contribute more to the ARF Fund, which will help fund necessary ARF activities, especially those in new Asean member countries.