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Published on April 15, 2008

It was a conventional security approach to an unconventional security challenge. The military took a direct hit and felt the need to respond, to show its might as the government went into damage-control mode.

But, needless to say, four years later none of the measures taken up by the military have succeeded in quelling the violence caused by a new generation of Malay Muslim insurgents whose motivation continues to puzzle academics, counter-insurgency specialists and the country's security planners.

The January 4, 2004 raid was a turning point in many respects. It forced the government to admit that a new generation of separatists has resurfaced in the region, and militant cells have proliferated throughout the three southernmost provinces and succeeded in maintaining the level of violence there ever since. About 3,000 have died since January 2004.

The initial complaint from officials comprising the state's security apparatus was that they didn't have the legal tools they needed to take down the insurgents. In mid-2005, a day after the military hit various targets in the heart of Yala, the Thaksin administration pushed through a controversial emergency decree, which permitted authorities to detain suspects without charge and gave blanket immunity to officials while they were on duty.

Following the September 2006 coup, the military-installed government pushed through an Internal Security Act and breathed new life into the Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc). The move, said critics, essentially cemented the military's role in national politics with its nationwide mechanism that made the commanders of each of the country's four regions the heads of Isoc in their respective areas.

Still, Isoc has been unable to muster the kind of clout it once commanded during the Cold War era. Part of the reason for this, according to associate professor Panitan Wattanayagorn, a security specialist at Chulalongkorn University, is that officials sent to work at Isoc see it as a temporary assignment with the understanding that they will one day return to their respective agencies.

The government may desire an "interagency approach" for the southern crisis but it is not getting it through Isoc, despite it having the supporting legislation.

"The country needs a new mandate and Isoc has to go in that direction. Right now Isoc is misunderstood and under-utilised because we allowed bureaucratic tradition to guide it," Panitan said.

The feeling is that the security agencies that come under the military-dominated Isoc feel they are giving up their power to it instead of being part of something that is supposed to possess a new mandate.

The challenge now, said Panitan, is to reform the security sector by pushing through a process of the "civilianisation" of the military. In real terms, Isoc would eventually become a civilian-led agency, something like the US Department of Homeland Security. Security threats, said Panitan, have become too complex to be handled by a conventional military approach and this reform, which is currently being studied by the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission, would better address this changing security landscape.

Complex security challenges such as the ongoing insurgency in the deep South, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), or security challenges stemming from the conflict between Burmese rebels and the Rangoon government, would come under the purview of the new and improved Isoc. Routine work, on the other hand, would remain with the Army, the police and respective ministries.

Panitan foresees the top layer comprising civilians, the second layer being made up of security planners from various sectors of the armed forces, and the third encompassing civilian analysts, who would comprise a permanent party within Isoc.

But not all are convinced that Thailand's security community will be able to get away from its "I know best" attitude and give a meaningful role to the advisory council.

Moreover, Human Right Watch's Sunai Phasuk said there are just too many disturbing aspects in the Internal Security Act in its current state. These include the amnesty clause that more or less gives government officials the power to get away with questionable acts as long as they are on duty at the time the acts are committed.

Furthermore, the act did not give a definition as to what constitutes a security threat. In this respect, the Cabinet decides what constitutes a security threat based upon recommendations from Isoc.

Any reform of the security sector, said Sunai, must include a checks-and-balances mechanism to ensure professionalism and independence so that the agency would not be exploited by politicians of the day.

Moreover, the agency should have to answer to elected representatives in the Parliament. A Parliament standing committee must have the power to summon the agency's top boss and personnel for questioning and grilling.

"In a democracy, heads of all security agencies must report to the elected representatives who are mandated by the people," Sunai said.

DON PATHAN

THE NATION