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Published on January 12, 2008

In the weeks and months ahead, the Army, under the leadership of General Anupong Paochinda, has an important mission to fulfil: to disentangle itself from politics and submit to the authority of the new civilian government regardless of who the prime minister is. The military top brass who make up the Council for National Security (CNS) will leave the political centre stage and return to the barracks, where they belong. Theoretically, this should not be too difficult a task, as Anupong and other military leaders have publicly announced that it is their intention to leave politics in the hands of civilians.

But in reality the best we can hope for, at least in the foreseeable future, is a certain measure of "separateness" between the new government and the armed forces. The new civilian administration is expected to learn not to interfere or politicise the armed forces, which should focus its attention on dealing with national security threats.

Over the past 16 months since the coup, the armed forces have been distracted by extracurricular activities and the business of running the country through the interim Surayud government, while also implementing the constitutional reform that led to last month's election. The military's self-appointed role as white knight coming to the rescue of Thai democracy will remain a subject for debate for a long time. Already its performance as the supposed guardian of democracy and as reluctant ruler has been widely questioned.

During military rule, the distracted Army, which is the lead agency in the fight against Islamic militants/Malay separatists in the Deep South, has stumbled while the insurgents appeared to gain the upper hand.

The campaign of terror, in which both Buddhist and Muslim civilians, including community leaders, teachers and civil servants are hunted down and killed, continues unabated. The number of people who have lost their lives in the conflict in the past four years is over 2,700 and counting. For the Army to be criticised as a poor, ineffectual ruler is understandable. After all, running a developing country that is tied to the global economy and influenced by its impacts is beyond the ability of any military leader. But it is disturbing to see the Army appearing weak and indecisive in handling the strife-torn southernmost region.

Effective military action must go hand in hand with attempts to find a political settlement and permanent peace for the troubled region. Allowing insurgents to run amok killing innocent civilians will not inspire confidence among local people in the government's ability to restore peace.

The Army has suffered high casualties in the past few years at the hands of the insurgents, who seem to be able to move freely to set up roadside bombs, lay ambushes and flee the scene, hide their weapons and melt into the civilian population.

What surprises the Thai people is that the Army has apparently not learned from its mistakes after more than four years of fighting the insurgents. Why hasn't it improved its tactics and strategies?

The recent arrest in the Deep South of three Army intelligence officers and seven policemen for spying for the enemy provided the clearest evidence of the Army's incompetence and lack of professionalism. As investigators widen their net to try to weed out traitors in the ranks of the Army, police and security agencies, many more are expected to be arrested and prosecuted.

This was bound to happen as the Army has, for years, been performing dismally in intelligence gathering, for which it relies on a small number of officers who speak Yawi, a Malay dialect spoken in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.

A loose command structure, failure to impose thorough background checks on informants, and a lack of communication among rival security agencies explain why classified military information - from daily troop movements to top-secret operations - was passed to the enemy. It also explains why troops who were supposed to fight insurgents ended up being slaughtered in large numbers. Top military commanders, particularly those who hold high ranks at the Fourth Army, which is in charge of the troubled region, must also take the blame - not only for failure to effectively suppress the insurgency but also for poor performance in discharging their duties.

The Nation