Generals manufacture 'Burmeseness'

 The country was emancipated from British rule on January 4, 1948. Over the past six decades, Burma has experienced tremendous political, economic and social turbulence. The post-independence period has been painted with despair and uncertainty. Recent unrest demonstrates that Burma is still fighting for political liberation.

Sixty years on, the incomplete nation-building process is consistently exploited by the junta as a rationale for it to remain firmly in power. The attempt here is to look back and find out what has gone wrong in Burmese national development. At the heart of this failure lies the way past and present Burmese leaders have manipulated the notion of nationhood. Six negative associations with what "Burmeseness" entails include:

1) A xenophobic feeling that has become deeply rooted in the mentality of the country's leaders. Because of Burma's history of having been colonised by the British, it is understandable why Burmese leaders of the past were highly nationalistic and endorsed an anti-West foreign policy. However, leaders of the present generation continue to be xenophobic towards any nation that may pose a threat to their power despite lacking a connection with the colonial period.

Xenophobia was evident following the recent crackdown on street protesters when the Burmese junta strongly condemned the West for interfering in domestic affairs, scheming to create chaos, and wanting to topple the regime. Xenophobia was also stirred up within Burma as part of an effort to divert attention from the real issues, such as poverty, human-rights violations and the country's lack of political freedom.

2) The junta has defined 'Burmeseness', as being somewhat equal to militarism. Since the first military coup in 1962, militarism has been tightly entwined with Burmese nationhood. The military regime of the late General Ne Win successfully introduced socialism as a new way of life. Parliamentary democracy was nullified. The Burmese became increasingly dependent on the state for all aspects of their lives. 

Today, military despotism remains strong in Burma, not because most Burmese believe in it, but rather because the military has proclaimed itself an indispensable pillar in politics. In the current political crisis, the international community agreed that a regime change was unlikely and that any solution would need the military's involvement since it has governed the country for over 40 years.

3) Now that militarism has become a part of 'Burmeseness', democracy was therefore regarded as being in opposition to Burmese nationhood. Democracy, despite its abstract nature, has been treated as though it is a visible enemy of the Burmese regime. In fact, democracy was defined as being such a threat that the Burmese military simply would not surrender its power to a democratic government. Hence, Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), has been perceived as a national threat too. And if Suu Kyi had ever ruled the country, she no doubt would have redefined 'Burmeseness' as being somehow democratic.

4) The perception of the Burmese as the superior race among other ethnic minorities has long obstructed genuine reconciliation, especially since 'Burmeseness' has been closely identified with being Burmese. Prior to 1989, the Burmese government described its conflicts with ethnic minorities as a defence of 'Burmeseness'. Burmese elites attempted to prove the longevity of the Burmese race on the land that is today known as Burma. Thus, the battle for Burmese political hegemony was rightful and conducted on the basis of protecting nationhood.

Even when most ethnic minorities concluded cease-fire agreements with the central government, the members of which were predominately Burmese, relations between different ethnicities have never been stable. Smaller ethnic groups may have been invited to participate in the National Convention, but their voices were hardly heard.

5) Socialism has been part and parcel of Burmese nationhood since its introduction in 1962. Because of the anti-West, anti-democracy stance and the retreat into international isolation, socialism seemed to fit in perfectly with Burmese nationhood based on military totalitarianism. Successive military leaders subsequently combined socialism and Buddhism while emphasising the importance of upholding a sense of communality and self-sacrifice.

Socialism has severely damaged Burma's economy and the Burmese suffer greatly from poverty without state support. Currently, signs of Burma flirting with capitalism may seem more in evidence, with the opening up of its oil and gas fields to foreign investments. However, while those at the top are enjoying the benefits that come with gradual economic liberalisation, the Burmese have been left in the dark world of socialism.

6) 'Burmeseness' is also about the expression of regionalism, with Asean at the core. After long years in isolation, the regime changed its mind in 1997 when it was admitted into Asean despite global criticism.

In the eyes of Burma's leaders, the general portrayal of Asean as being anti-Western and its adherence to the non-interference principle directly corresponds to the function of 'Burmeseness'.

The regime built an ideological alliance with Asean to reduce foreign pressure and uphold the authoritative power of Burmese nationhood, in the name of both regionalism and nationalism. Asean, on the other hand, has lost its influence over Burma since some member states were more attuned to their own interests than those of the region, reflected through the grouping's inability to handle the Burma issue during the last summit in Singapore.

The Burmese have had to endure 60 years of misfortune and bad politics. Burmese nationhood has been misused by state authorities, and therefore does not truly represent the essence of being Burmese at the citizen level.

On the eve of the country's 60th anniversary of independence from Britain, it can be said that the Burmese might have been set free from British control long ago, but that they are still literally colonised by their own military strongmen.

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. Opinions expressed in this article are his.

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Special to The Nation

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