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Social justice implications of emerging responses to climate change in Asia

By Louis Lebel

Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER)

Changes

The world is committed to a changed climate. Temperature, rainfall patterns and seasons are going to change faster than we have experienced in many parts of the world.

Water resources and food systems will be affected. In Asia it will often be harder to grow food. Some rivers will swell for a decade or two while glaciers and snow packs melt, but then those inputs to base flows will slow to a trickle. Investing and living in coastal cities will be riskier with even modest changes in sea-levels or increases in intensity of cyclones and storms.

About many of these changes in risks, especially those closely related to temperature, a surprising amount is known. For some issues there is still a lot uncertainty. There is still a lot to learn about clouds and cyclones, and how the ocean interacts with the atmosphere. Science is getting better faster, but will never eliminate all uncertainties.

We also know there is a small chance of some very big impacts.  Scientists seriously discuss the risks of ice sheets melting, changes in ocean circulation, but acknowledge the complex feedbacks and amplifying effects make prediction hard. Nobody wants such catastrophes to happen; few even want to think about them.

Impacts

Although global warming is a "global phenomenon" the impacts will not be experienced equally. They are frequently modified by local conditions. And people are not at same risk.

Vulnerabilities vary hugely across different social groups. We know this by studying how extreme climate events and climate-related disasters now impact mothers, small fishers, poor farming households and children.   And by realities of everyday life in current cultures: if water in the dry becomes harder to get, if the drinking wells nearby go dry because of over-use, it is women that will have to walk further.

Influence on the development policies which make people vulnerable in the first place also varies hugely.  We know this by studying and helping the disenfranchised - minorities, migrants - that mainstream development passes by exactly because these groups have insufficient political voice and have fewer opportunities to set organise.

High vulnerabilities and low influence spell disaster.

The impacts of climate change tomorrow will be distributed very unequally as a result of entrenched unfairness in how societies in Asia are developing today.

Responses

Across Asia governments are beginning to respond. They are taking more notice of the questions asked by their citizens, the stories written by their journalists, and the advice given by their experts. Climate change is "in". Today it is cool for a politician to talk about warming.  As I speak here in Bangkok the interim PM of Thailand is speaking to my colleagues at Chiang Mai University on Global Warming.

We know and have heard a lot about the potential impacts of climate change. There are many indigestible items in the short-term policy menu. Embarking on new urban forms, re-orienting energy policy in terms of services and demand-management,  restoring flood plains and coastal mangroves, these are decadal projects.

But just as society is finally getting interested in understanding more about the risks of various climate change impacts there is also a need to scrutinize emerging policy responses. 

What are the social justice implications of the emerging responses to climate change in Asia? 

This is what I am going to focus on for the rest of this talk.

I do so because we are surfing the crest of an advertising blitz, for some headed towards Bali, for others, elections. Claiming a particular policy will help stop global warming or help society adapt to its likely impacts is good copy. But like all ads - it pays to read the fine print.  And, like all fads - it pays to think about tomorrow.

What I read and think leads me to conclude, unhappily, that, overall, the emerging responses in Asia to climate change, both in terms of reducing rates of emissions growth and adapting to climate change, to exacerbate or distract from addressing existing social injustices.  I group these observations into three: neglect; shifting risks; and tokenism.

I will deal with each of these in turn.

Neglect

Neglect is when the scope or effects on a disadvantage group of a policy are simply not considered. It becomes a social justice issue when such exclusion creates additional burdens or losses of opportunities.

Do the current responses of governments, firms, and civil society to climate change address the needs and concerns of disadvantaged groups?

Reducing emissions

Calls to reduce emissions often make reference to the huge rates of growth and total recent contributions of the developing countries in Asia, especially, China and India.

Although global warming is a "global phenomenon" its causes (like impacts) are not distributed equally.

By far, it is the early-industrializing economies of the world that have contributed, per person, the most to the cumulative emissions that cause global warming.   The late-industrializing, developing, countries don't want, and shouldn't have to, forgo the right to develop in the pursuit of global net emission reductions.

It is just and reasonable that developed nations should take the lead responsibility and be pursuing emission reductions vigorously. The Climate Convention and Kyoto Protocol Process reflect this logic in separation of Annex I and II countries. Various promises made to assist with technology transfers are based on similar ideals.

Even in absence of international incentives and pressures there are often compelling reasons to pursue cleaner technologies and energy efficiencies. Human health and costs are often the most important of these. Reductions in emissions important to global warming are a side-benefit. Decoupling emissions from economic growth is crucial. Brahma referred eloquently to this dilemma in Asia and indeed for the world. 

A similar issue of injustice by neglect can arise within countries. Policies that result in much higher fuel prices, carbon taxes and expensive technologies that save energy may make life more difficult for low income earners while have almost no affect on the wealthy if they are poorly designed or not well coordinated with other actions - for example, investments in cheap, reliable and accessible mass transit systems in Asia's many big cities.

Reducing the rate of global warming is an equity issue. It is unfair if those individuals who have contributed least to cumulative emissions end up bearing the largest burdens in the pursuit of lower global (or national) emissions.

Reducing vulnerabilities

Injustice by neglect also appears to be emerging as a feature of the few substantive adaptation policies now being articulated because they have been driven by assessment of easily measured costs and thus largely reflect threats to infrastructure and built environments rather than soils, fisheries and rural livelihoods. 

But it is people most immediately and directly dependent on natural resources who are often most vulnerable to direct impacts of climate change.  They don't have the same scope to substitute with fossil-fuels, trade and purchase stuff from elsewhere. The burdens of coping with increased risks of extreme rainfall events, changed flood regimes, unprecedented droughts will often fall on the very groups which now work hardest to grow and catch food to eat and market. 

Policies aimed at sequestering carbon or promoting use of biofuels as renewable energy sources may be increasing vulnerability too.  Official statements like "we will help stop global warming by stopping farmers from deforesting the mountains" might really mean stopping farmers who have lived there from growing food and making a living.  The recent passing of a long-delayed community forestry bill by the interim Thai parliament is now being scrutinized by proponents and opponents. Decent ASEAN meting pledged  15 million hectares of new forests. On whose land will there be grown?

Some policy figures argue the merits of globalization. At least for wealthy countries it means that food security is not such a serious problem: one can always trade your way out.  For many other locations, provided the climate impacts are not too severe, the interactions between globalization as it really unfolds and climate change could be complex. Freer and fairer trade of agricultural products produced in rural Asia might reduce vulnerabilities. But distorted trade driven bilaterally by very powerful countries within and outside the region could well exacerbate the impacts of climate change on competitiveness and consequently human security.

A final injustice by neglect is to frame climate change as just as external hazard and thus neglect causes of social vulnerability within a society, a country. Speech we heard this morning we heard how global warming could be blamed for disasters.

Empowerment as a response to the problem of injustice by neglect

Empowerment of disadvantaged groups is the primary way to deal with the problem of injustice by neglect. By empowerment I specifically mean opportunities for public engagement in negotiation of emission reduction or adaptation policies as well as democratic processes through which development that benefits powerful groups but which makes people more vulnerable can be openly challenged.

Empowerment should expand the options and opportunities for local adaptation. Farmers, fishers and other natural resource-dependent peoples need social, economic and political space in which to exercise their expertise and rights to adapt.

The poor do not have much to do on mitigation: their problem is one of under rather than over-consumption of energy and material resources. But they should have a say in measures to reduce wasteful consumption which end up making their life more difficult and risky.

Shifting risks

Shifting risks is said to occur when efforts to reduce the involuntary risks of one group to climate-related changes is based on redistributing those risks to another group of people. This is inherently unfair and common today.

Do the current responses of governments, firms and individuals to climate change simply shift the risks on to less visible disadvantaged groups?

Protecting cities from floods, securing food and energy supplies

History tells us that efforts to reduce the risks of flood and other climate-related disasters are partly about shifting risks onto other people.

Thus, the powerful and influential inhabitants of cities will invest in their own protection if they have the funds.  Who will be kept high and dry by these protective walls and diversion canals around Bangkok? And who whose land will become a lake, whose house awash in the rebounding waves? Will there be adequate (any) compensation for those that become drains and storage ponds? Is assurance accessible to those who most need it?

Expect measures to protect built environments from sea-level rise to involve risk redistribution not just reductions.

The social and political responses of more powerful actors to protect themselves pose challenges that exacerbate those wrought by a changed climate.   This is the dark-side of adaptation.

Alternative energy sources and their risks

Initiatives to reduce the carbon emissions which cause global warming may also have a dark-side.  Consider recent enthusiasm expressed by ASEAN leaders for nuclear power.  On the one hand, it is easy to understand - why shouldn't we pursue all options, after all developed countries have. On the other, one should demand that any assessments of options are fully informed an deliberated.

We should ask now: where will the waste be stored? Where will the nuclear plants be sited? Who will be responsible and accountable to the public if the energy produced ends up costing a lot more than planned (as often happens).

Don't kid yourself: legitimizing links that call these choices responses to "climate change" are and will be made.

Re-labelling nuclear or hydro-power as a contribution to "stopping global warming" does not make it an option that should therefore be pursued. The label may be misleading because of poor accounting. And there are other costs and risks, often to different people which must be explored, debated and dealt with - perhaps with massive compensation, insurance. Maybe the best option is still a coal power fire station but with improved technologies.

My main point here is not to make claims about what energy sources we should, or should not, be using, but that comprehensive assessment of options, burdens and risks should be a normal of part energy governance including effects to incorporate climate change within them.

Addressing injustice by shifting risks

Injustice by shifting risks, like that of neglect, must primarily be addressed through empowerment, representation and democratization. Financing and technical assistance for adaptation and disaster management by wealthy peoples within countries, and from wealthy to poorer nations among, should be institutionalised as preventative and strategic not just incident and relief driven. Rights should be protected. 

Tokenism

Tokenism is when extravagant claims are made for a response to get credit when in reality the contribution to finding a solution to the problem is miniscule.  It becomes an issue of social justice when it results in additional unfairness or inequity.

Should we take the current responses of governments, firms and individuals to climate change seriously?

Generic examples

At risk of offending individuals I give two generic but contrasting examples and then a  specific one because it is mixed.

First by claiming to have ticked-off the climate change box the need for an agency to act at all lessens.  Funds and expertise that needed to be mobilized to address real risks and their unfair distribution don't happen because of the distraction. Big speeches, national action plans are prone.

Second by investing a lot in an intervention, for example, large scale water storage and diversion infrastructure, it is tempting to multiply and overlay the project benefits without really assessing their validity. Securing water for food in a changing climate is tempting to  add to rationales. But empty dams don't do much for dry season irrigation. Nor do dams with sufficient water but where it is allocated and managed primarily to other uses. Long-term and strategic planning needs informed inputs.

Promising initiatives, anomalous policies

There are some promising initiatives in Thailand promoting demand-side management of energy. One example is the labeling programs for household appliances which are effective in creating incentives for firms to produce, retailers sell, and customers buy more efficient appliances, especially at the medium and higher ends of the market.  Another very recent experiment is the call for very large energy users (industries) to bid for energy savings, which if they meet, will be paid for. Energy Service Companies could conceivably put together such bids.  But this is only for very large users. 

But there are also some gross anomalies in overall energy policy. Thus the primary agencies responsible for electricity supply, EGAT, works under an institutional framework where its revenues are based on how much electricity it produces, not the energy services it provides. There is thus a (perverse) incentive to focus on increasing supply.  Policy gaps like this need to be fixed or demand-side management will essentially remain a token measure in the big picture.

Dealing with the problem of injustice by tokenism

The problem of injustice by token measures can be tackled in two ways. First, by calling the bluff. Here the media and independent analysts play a key role. Second, by demonstrating and applauding initiatives with real and multiple values, even while showing how they could be refined and improved.

I emphasize this because I am not against labeling multiple benefits of programs, policies and projects if they are real - for this talk, they contribute to making development in Asia fairer and more equitable.

Thus the primary reason to pursue policies on reducing emissions or risks of climate-related disasters need not be driven primarily by concerns with climate change.  Issues of improving human health, access to affordable energy, and coping with current disaster risks remain more important priorities in developing countries in Asia.

Conclusions

The actual response so far by Asian societies - whether we are talking about firms, households, non-governmental or government agencies -- has been modest. Very few questions have been asked about the social justice implications of these responses.

Greater public exploration and scrutiny of a wider range of response options is needed.  Informed deliberation is critical. The synergies and trade-offs with ecologically sustainable and socially just development need to be tested.

It will take substantial vigilance by the media and public to make sure adaptation and mitigation to climate change, obviously needed and desirable, don't turn into just another triumph of narrow, powerful and fossilized interests.

This essay was the basis of a keynote talk given at the Asia News Network Conference on "Asia's emerging response to climate change"  held in Bangkok, 23 November 2007.

Dr. Louis Lebel is the Director of the Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University. Find out more about his research group, USER at: www.sea-user.org, www.mpowernet.org or contact him by email: louis@sea-user.org