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Published on October 26, 2007

No, it is not about the Thai-initiated six-party talks, as recently proposed by Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont. Gambari has his own version of multi-party talks on the Burma issue, with the aim of expanding the scope of countries involved and a set of clear requests that would be pressed upon the military junta.

Rumours have been spreading among Western diplomats that Gambari, toward the end of his Asian tour, will come up with his own formula for a multi-party framework that will comprise all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the US, Britain, France, Russia and China - together with India, Japan, Norway and possibly Singapore.

The choice of India and Japan is understandable considering their existing strategic interests in Burma. Singapore is likely to partake in Gambari's latest initiative as the chairman and representative of Asean. Norway would be invited because the country has been busy on the international stage in the past few years, acting as a peace broker in Sri Lanka and Indonesia's Aceh province. It is also the birthplace of the Nobel Peace Prize, which was granted to Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991. Furthermore, Norway is willing to spend money on the peace process in Burma.

I can understand where Gambari's idea comes from; he might be thinking that the participation of the UN Security Council will add a stronger sense of legitimacy and seriousness when he deals with Burma. Burma's two important neighbours - China and India - will also be able to exercise their influence while keeping an eye on their economic interests in the country. And to garnish the new cooperative framework with a regional enthusiasm and involvement, Singapore, on Asean's behalf, is the right player for Gambari's purpose. So far, Singapore has been adamant in its approach toward the Burmese regime.

Although Gambari's design sounds thoughtful and is replete with eagerness to generate a breakthrough, it surely guarantees differences of opinion and even more complications to the current situation.

First, and perhaps most significant, is the response from China. It is certain that Beijing will reject Gambari's formula, which will be perceived as further internationalising the Burmese problem. After all, China wishes to see the problem handled in the regional framework, or in other words, in its own backyard. This is because China considers itself the main regional power. More essentially, Burma is and has always been under China's sphere of influence. India, wrangling with the Chinese influence in Burma, comprehends how China's jealousy might be fierce at times.   

Will China be content to allow the US, parts of the EU, or even Japan, to poke their noses in what it sees as its protectorate? If it is not content, its reputation would be further tainted. China has already been criticised by the West for protecting the brutal regime in exchange for economic benefits, access to a sea port on the Indian Ocean and the wellbeing of Chinese migrants in Burma. Internationalising the issue would mean questioning the legitimacy of China's role and influence in Burma. This is the last thing Beijing needs when it wants to be concentrating on hosting the Olympics in 2008.

The second problem Gambari must take into account is whether the Burmese junta will approve his formula. Like China, Burma feels that its wounds would be ripped open publicly. This fear may cause the regime to tighten its political grasp and drive it even further into isolation. There have been stories that the Burmese junta is wary of a possible US attack - and this could partly explain why it abruptly moved the capital into the jungle.

With the US as part of the new Gambari multi-party talks, Burma has every reason to be convinced that such a long-held fear may turn to reality. Moreover, the regime would be suspicious of US neutrality, since Washington has never been shy of lending support to Aung San Suu Kyi, her National League for Democracy, political dissidents and certain ethnic minorities who have refused to conclude cease-fires with the Burmese government.

Burma's same suspicion could be extended to include Britain and France, members of the Security Council and representatives of the European Union, which has maintained a hard-line policy toward the regime.

Finally, enlarging the number of parties directly involved in the Burma issue might make Asean look silly. At the end of the day, and whether one likes it or not, Burma is still a member of Asean. During the past month, Asean members have expressed concern about the grave situation in Burma and have called for genuine political reconciliation. Some elements in the regional grouping have even condemned the regime. Never before has Asean opted for such strong language regarding a fellow member. Singapore's ex-diplomat, Barry Desker, even suggested a suspension of Burma's membership until it learned to behave.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Special to The Nation

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is the author of "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations".

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