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Published on September 29, 2007

"Thailand has no potential to solve the problem in Burma, but China and India might have channels to communicate with them," he told reporters at the UN General Assembly in New York this week.

Beijing finally broke its silence on Thursday, but declined to condemn the killings of peaceful protesters in the crackdown that began on Wednesday.

Surayud's statement may have been too little and too late for the dead Burmese. What's more, the extent of Thailand's ability to influence Burma is restricted by its shaky historical ties with the military-run state. Burma has never seen Thailand as an honest broker.

From the coup in 1962 to the ouster of General Ne Win in 1988 in the aftermath of a massive student-led uprising, Thailand's policy gave tremendous space to the armed ethnic armies along the common border.

Besides, Ne Win was not only Sino-phobic - he didn't trust the Thais either.

The nature of the bilateral relations began to change when General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh became the Army chief. Chavalit wanted to convince the Burmese junta he was a friend in need, when he became the first senior foreign official to visit the country just months after its military had brutally crushed the 1988 demonstrators, killing some 3,000 people throughout the country.

Seeing the vast economic potential in resource-rich Burma, Chavalit tried to adopt a more balanced approach.

But the new-found friendship proved to be nothing special and would continue to be shaped by mistrust, overlapping claims, cross-border insurgencies, as well as narcotics, for years to come.

As cross-border intrusions continued, on and off, with Burmese troops crossing over into Thai soil to raid refugee camps, the Banharn Silpa-archa administration continued what Chavalit had started.

There were quiet negotiations over the lucrative Yadana gas exploration and pipeline project involving senior members of the then State Law and Order Restoration Council and the then Thai finance minister Surakiart Sathirathai. But the Thai-Burmese border had a life of its own and a billion-dollar energy deal was not going to make much of a dent in the nature of the bilateral ties.

Thaksin Shinawatra's administration was not much different in terms of substance. There was plenty of hype behind his announcements, but in the end Thaksin bit off more than he could chew.

From day one, Thaksin told the public that drugs was one of his top priorities. He pointed his finger at the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army, a pro-Rangoon outfit accused of supplying Thailand and the world with some of the finest grade-four heroin and millions of methamphetamine pills.

The end result was the so-called drug war that resulted in the questionable deaths of some 2,500 Thai nationals. The Wa army, meanwhile, continues to remain as strong as ever.

Ignoring the historical link between drugs and insurgency in Burma, Thaksin thought economic incentives alone were enough to bring an end to the conflict in Burma. But in the final analysis, the Burmese junta saw his policy for what it was - a cheap loan and nothing more.

Today, Thaksin's old policy is coming back to haunt him. He is being charged by the current government, which ousted him in a coup a year ago, with giving government loans to Burma on the understanding that the junta would buy satellite technology from his family business, Shin Corp.

Even so, there was nothing the Thais could do to get the Burmese to change their mindset.

Bangkok shot itself in the foot when then-foreign minister Surakiart announced that it would initiate the so-called Bangkok Process to help pave the road to democracy for Burma.

Surakiart should have known that it was a kiss of death from the beginning, as Rangoon could not and would not see Thailand as an honest broker.

Historically, there has always been a need for ambiguity. Exchanges of gunfire are always followed by heated words, as well as the periodic closure of the common border - by the Burmese.

Perhaps these closures are a reminder to the Thais that the Burmese can stand on their own two feet, and that in the end the economic and investment incentives in Burma are just too great for the Thais to resist. Thai governments come and go but the Burmese generals are here to stay - at least that's what they tell themselves anyway.

 Besides, there is always China. And India. Who needs Thailand?

Don Pathan

The Nation