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Published on August 27, 2007

While other bilateral matters such as trade, investment and development assistance are pivotal, they must be viewed within the framework of their long-standing democratic traditions. In the absence of such a foundation, future Japanese-Indian friendship would falter.

Both countries have been very discreet about their political assets - one as the world's largest, the other as Asia's most developed democracy - knowing full well that any emphasis on this commonality would inevitably be interpreted as a direct assault on China. Immediately, their budding ties could be tossed off balance. Within the region, no nation's foreign policy promotes democracy and human rights. Since its independence India has never pledged or even attempted to promote its Asian-brand democracy abroad. Japan has endeavoured to do so to varying degrees since the early 1970s, but through economic development models. However, under Abe's leadership, Japan's diplomacy has become more assertive and more articulate about its democratic components. His initiative right after taking up the premiership to build a democratic arc, stretching from northeast Asia down to Australia and then up to India, was met with cold shoulders.

What is interesting about the current deepening of Japan-India relations is the timing. In the past few years Japan has refocused on India and its strategic potential. Two factors need to be noted. First, the overall improvement of India-US relations, started in 2000 by the Clinton administration and expanded on by the Bush administration, laid the groundwork for Japan's enthusiasm about India. Stronger and more stable India-US ties following the agreement on peaceful use of nuclear technology provided an additional incentive.

The second factor is India's growing integration with Asean-initiated multilateral processes, including the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting (Asem) and the Asean Plus One process. The world's largest democracy is no longer an outsider in the overall Asian scheme of things. Kudos must go to the Indian leaders who overcame the Siamese-twin syndrome with Pakistan in 1995, when India became a full dialogue partner of Asean, leaving Pakistan behind.

India is considered the historical mother of several Southeast Asian countries due to the influence of its culture. Unfortunately, when the region is taken as a whole, the India-Asean ties are still nascent. After New Delhi's wrong-footed diplomacy on Cambodia in 1979, both sides were left groping for more than a decade for a modus operandi to move their relations forward. That opportunity came in 1991 with the "Look East" policy of India's Narasimha Rao government. By the late 1990s, India's interaction with Asean had intensified as its diplomacy began to produce tangible results. Its full dialogue partner status led it to join the ARF and then Asem last year. Its wise decision to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 simultaneously with China immediately also placed New Delhi on par with Beijing, at least as the first two signatories - something which Tokyo and Canberra failed to take advantage of with their accession in 2005.

Sooner rather than later India will be ushered in as a member of Apec, whose leaders meet in Sydney early next month. India's venture into Asean shares a similar trait to Vietnam after joining the grouping in 1995. Just a little over a decade since its admission, Vietnam's position has been fortified through increased integration with the region and beyond, including normalisation of ties with major powers - especially the US. Hanoi is now a leading Asean voice. As such, India's growing influence and stature in the region will rest on good ties and integration with Asean and its dialogue partners.

From this perspective, closer India-Japan relations are beneficial to Asean for practical and strategic purposes. Apart from China as the regional engine of economic growth, Asean is hungry for India's professionals and technological wizardry, which are nicely complemented by Japan's huge capital base. Asean leaders are watching to see which of the three nations first completes ongoing negotiations to sign a free-trade agreement with the grouping. Coordination and cooperation around these Asian economies with Asean as a central pole would enhance the politics of multi-polarity in Asia. Fears of a China-centric Asia would be allayed by this dynamic. The three-year old East Asian Summit is ideal fertile ground. Strategically, it would be an added advantage to maintain the US's current influence without nitpicking. In short, the US can maintain its status quo.

The Asian triangular power structure will strengthen the regional security environment without resort to any US power. The US still can engage with the trio through a variety of economic and security forums. As long as Asean can keep its plane flying steadily with China on one side and a combined Japan-India on the other, the security outlook could be further Asianised. That would affect their security responsibilities, which will arise in future. They have to work harder together to sustain this newly found dynamic as an equal partner. Eventually, this could evolve into a new paradigm for regional peace, security and stability, as well as a pillar for future pan-Asian institution building.

Kavi Chongkittavorn