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Published on July 25, 2007

Marching protesters to his residence is not unimaginable, neither are the apparent attempts to provoke violence. What's more disturbing in the wake of Sunday's near miss though is the general assumption that things would have turned out differently if someone had died or been seriously injured.

As the nation continues on its very painful learning curve, it's time we rethought the "mob rules". Should we allow aggressive protesters to besiege the residence of a highly respected national figure in the manner of Sunday night? This is debatable at best, but if we are to accept that it's within citizens' democratic rights to do so, the political "convention" attached to the consequences of such a demonstration must be reassessed.

Analysts have rightly pointed out that the military junta emerged triumphant following Sunday's confrontation because more policemen were wounded than protesters, and because no evidence surfaced in the media of any demonstrator having been assaulted. The analysts were also right in saying that it would have been a very big blow to the junta if a protester had been beaten up or shot at.

The conventional "mob rules" have been applied in both analyses. It's nobody's fault because this has long been the case for Thailand. "Demonstrations" mean nothing unless someone gets killed. Only violence can force quick political change and peaceful rallies are just for losers. Why a protest takes place is not as important to the media as whether it will put conflicting parties on a bloody collision course.

Something is very wrong with our nation. The anti-Thaksin protests lasted several months despite the high numbers of people participating. It took just a few days for the government of Suchinda Kraprayoon to collapse in 1992 because the anti-Suchinda campaign had deteriorated into street battles. While both prime ministers may have deserved to go, the anti-Suchinda movement was arguably smaller than the anti-Thaksin campaign.

In 1992, protest leader Chamlong Srimuang decided to march demonstrators, who had converged at Sanam Luang, down Rajdamnoen Avenue and the rest is history. The strategy has become embedded in the political demonstration textbook ever since. If you want to win or grab public or international attention, all protests need sacrificial lambs. Provocation has become an essential part of the game.

The strategy was also frequently pondered during the anti-Thaksin campaign, but fortunately what they lacked were truly aggressive protesters. Even so, the protest leaders and the government were engaged in psychological warfare, using threats of violence and a possible declaration of a state of emergency as bargaining tools. There were strong rumours that the besieging of the Nation Multimedia Group's head offices last year had some hidden motive to incite violence for political purposes.

Thai politics has placed far too much importance on "mob wars". This mentality has blinded everyone, from leaders to foreign observers. Governments nowadays fear corruption scandals less than threats of political riots. Protest leaders include provocation as part of their every plan. The media judge the stability of troubled governments not through what they have actually done, but on whether they will succumb to provocation and start clubbing or shooting demonstrators. The "rules of engagement" for police or soldiers are guided more by political expediency than humanitarianism.

Democracy may give citizens the right to provoke, as governments are presumed to be the more mature party. But overusing that right can come back to haunt democracy itself.

Where should we draw the line? At what point can we condone stone throwing or car-jacking or the act of setting fire to private or public properties as necessary political measures? And is it time to ask ourselves whether it's truly democratic to put other people's lives in danger to achieve a political aim?

We are back to that old question of whether it's possible in Thailand for governments to rise and fall on their own accord. Stubborn rulers are no less responsible for the popularity of using "desperate measures" because when the rule of law is not effective enough to force a political change, mob rule will always assert itself. The danger is the latter can easily blur an ideological fight, if not foul it.

When political expediency has less to do with the rule of law and a ruler's future depends more on how violent a rally his opponents can organise, we all will end up very confused.

In fact, we are baffled already. If the relatively peaceful anti-Thaksin protests are a blow to democracy, how come Sunday's "mob violence" is a triumph for a military dictatorship?

 Tulsathit Taptim