
Although the term may be unfamiliar to civilians, a "staybehind operation" is standard procedure for miliŽtary strategists to ensure safe exit from a theatre of battle.
As a seasoned combat comŽmander from the Cold War, junta chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin appears to be toying with the idea of leaving himself behind to engage in politics aimed at shielding his soldiers from reprisals.
An act of gallantry in combat may turn out to be foolŽhardy if applied out of context.
Before any military disenŽgagement, a cautious comŽmander will often pick crack units or close aides to stay behind at the scene in order to safeguard the rear, or to report firsthand observations on subsequent developments.
Staybehind troops are unsung heroes and will often perish so their comrades in arms can be saved.
If Sonthi fancies himself as defender of the junta's rear, he should know he is walking into a pack of political wolves. The military rule of engageŽment is rendered inapplicable.
A key feature of the September 19 coup is that top generals have reached a conŽsensus to maintain military influence, even after the genŽeral election.
The junta will no doubt hand over power to an elected government although the milŽitary will remain at the scene to ensure politics stays on course.
To outsiders, the Thai political system may appear a bit odd. But military officers see nothing wrong in limited political involvement in matŽters of security and stability.
Soldiers and their generals in the junta view Sonthi as a gutsy comrade willing to take a risk to cross into politics so the military maintains a voice in steering the country.
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont has found himself in the minority when it comes to carving out a role for Sonthi after the junta disbands.
The generals want to install Sonthi in a rearguard lookout post, preferably in the position of prime minister. Surayud is concerned the junta chief might perish behind enemy lines before he can accomplish anything, militarily or politiŽcally.
In the end, Sonthi will have the final say on his own fate.
He has many precedents on which to base his decision.
He can follow the example set in the 1960s by the late Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who took the government's helm after allowing two prime ministers to warm his seat.
He can emulate the leaderŽship model of General Suchinda Kraprayoon in the 1990s but avoid a repeat of the subsequent tragic ending by contesting elections.
Or, he can follow in the footsteps of the late Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, who wielded formidable influŽence as power broker behind the executive leader.
Or, he can set his own precedent by becoming the first junta leader to completely walk away from power withŽout looking back.
Whatever future Sonthi charts for himself, society should brace for a lingering military presence in the politiŽcal system.
If the next prime minister is not Sonthi or another top general, the generals are likely to work hard to ensure a miliŽtaryfriendly civilian at the government's helm.
The real issue is not about a military bent on succession of power or grabbing power. The dilemma is about military involvement, however restrained, in politics.
With rival camps gearing for vengeful politics, can the military be flushed out of the political system?
Avudh Panananda
The Nation