The spectre of weapons proliferation

This would reduce greatly the possibility that new civilian generation leads to military weapons capacity in more countries - the danger that haunts the world now through Iran's nuclear generation programme and its insistence on being able to enrich its own uranium. For once a country is able to enrich uranium for nuclear power generation it is not a difficult step to enrich uranium further to levels needed in nuclear bombs.

Thailand is the latest country to pursue nuclear power with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (Egat) putting forward the goal of a 4,000 megawatt (MW) nuclear plant by 2020 in order to make some dent on the additional 30,000 MW projected as needed by 2021 on top of the present 26,000 MW capacity.

Thailand joins Indonesia, which plans a 4,000 MW nuclear generation plant by 2017, and Vietnam for 2,000 MW by 2015. Elsewhere, Malaysia is looking at the idea and Burma's junta is embarking on a small research reactor - leading to all sorts of speculation as to where that could lead.

It is not only a matter of more states having potential weapons capability. Compounding fears is the possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of stateless terrorist groups. Proliferation of enrichment may make it easier for terrorist groups to obtain uranium. Small, unsophisticated but still horrific bombs can be made simply if enriched uranium or plutonium is available, as former US presidential adviser, Victor Gilinsky, writes in "Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats".

So, what should be done? The answer must be to put the dangerous aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle under multilateral government management and control.

Fuel enrichment for SE Asian countries (and others joining the nuclear club) would be carried out under the auspices of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a limited number of places, that is, confining enrichment to countries now already with the capacity, such as Japan.

The IAEA would then act as a guarantor for supply to generation plants. This would not only reduce weapons proliferation dangers. It would also provide for greater operating safety and be economically cheaper for countries wanting nuclear power.

Control of supply of enriched uranium though does not end the danger of weapons proliferation. Once a country has nuclear generators, it could make weapons from plutonium produced in the nuclear fission process. The North Korean's are believed to have used plutonium from their small research reactors for their nuclear test in October 2006.

A multilateral framework must therefore include treatment of spent fuel and common waste storage. While advocates of nuclear power generation say it is an ever safer technology, there is still no true solution to final disposal of high-level radioactive waste. This is waste that is dangerous for hundreds of years - and parts of it for thousands of years - before finally decaying to acceptable levels.

International management of the nuclear power cycle is not a new idea. It was promoted in the 1970s when there was a sprint to nuclear power in the wake of the oil shocks.

The IAEA's director-general, Dr Mohammad El Baradai, is a strong advocate. Multilateral management of the fuel cycle is also among recommendations in the 2005 report commissioned by outgoing UN secretary-general Koffi Anan on how to improve the UN and the global collective security system.

The US and Russia also have found common ground here. At the G8 meeting in St Petersburg in 2006 they agreed that enrichment should be limited to the small set of countries now with the technology and facilities. This built on a US initiative called the "Global Nuclear Energy Partnership", under which major Western and Japanese producers of nuclear fuel and reactor technology would undertake to provide other countries with reactors and fuel for the life of plants with the provision to take back spent fuel.

And the US and Russia are applying this approach to SE Asia. Earlier this year contracts were signed between the US Department of Energy, the Russian state nuclear fuel corporation, TVEL and the Vietnamese nuclear research centre at Dalat for removal of the high enriched uranium used in the Soviet-built reactor and its replacement with low enriched fuel. The Russians will take the old fuel and the US will supply the new. Washington has pledged to help Vietnam build a nuclear power plant if the country switches to non-weapons-grade uranium in its test reactor.

In their new embrace of nuclear power, SE Asian governments have responsibilities beyond determining how they can best meet electricity demand. They are all signatories to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) under which non weapons states vow not to divert any civilian nuclear programmes towards weapons production and work with the IAEA. Those signatories with nuclear weapons - the US, Russia, China, France and the UK - vow not to transfer weapons or technology to other states.

But the NNPT does not address the issue of enrichment capability. Iran is a signatory and says its programme is peaceful - yet Western governments are sceptical. The problem is that under the NNPT, it is possible for a signatory to say it is abiding by the treaty and exercising its right to have its own enrichment capability - and then once it has this capability, withdraw from the treaty and embark on weapons development. North Korea is a case in point. It ratified the treaty and then withdrew.

Therefore SE Asian governments should address this issue directly and declare that they will not embark on fuel enrichment - but rather import fuel and dispose of waste under multilateral management and safeguards. This would set an international example and encourage this multilateral approach elsewhere in the world.

Here there is a chance for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) to lead the way by pursuing a regional agreement or treaty on nuclear power under which signatories would commit to appropriate safeguards against weapons proliferation and general health and safety concerns. So far, though, nuclear power has yet to be addressed by Asean.

Andrew Symon

Singapore

The author is a Singapore based journalist and analyst/researcher specialising in energy and natural resources.