Amid increasing international calls for Suu Kyi's freedom, the focus is however not on her struggle against the Burmese regime for now. But July marks the 10th anniversary of Burma becoming a member of Asean. It is time now for Asean to seriously assess the membership of Burma, its promises given upon admission and how things have changed both in Burma and Asean itself.

In 1997, Thailand was a staunch supporter of Burma joining Asean. Then PM Chavalit Yongchaiyuth did not even hide the secret that he was a fan of the Burmese junta. In fact, Chavalit's endorsement of Burma's membership was not the first controversy he sank himself into.

After the Burmese military's suppression of democratic forces in 1988, Chatichai Choonhavan's buffet government, which included Chavalit as Army chief, adopted a friendly policy toward Burma based on mutual commercial interests with the consent of the military that was equally insatiably hungry. Chavalit was dispatched to Rangoon to mend bilateral ties. He was the first foreign dignitary to visit Burma after its brutal crackdown on pro-democracy activists.

With Thai support for Burma's Asean membership, Chavalit firmly defended the Burmese regime. He declared: "I believe the generals in the ruling SLORC will listen to me because we are friends. The Burmese are good people. They are more devout Buddhists than us." Chavalit also assured us that the Burmese military had no plan to stay in power forever. Ten years on, the junta does not seem to be willing to give up political power any time soon. The period is certainly long enough to severely damage Burma's democratic institutions.

In the past decade, not only has the Burmese military shown no sign of responding to international demands for political reforms, it has continued to challenge regional peace and security. This year alone, the junta's erratic behaviour captured world attention on numerous occasions, ranging from its diplomatic normalisation with North Korea and speculation that Pyongyang might have assisted in the development of a Burmese nuclear reactor, a deal with Russia in the building of a nuclear research centre in Rangoon, coupled with the extension of Suu Kyi's imprisonment.

Not long before that, Burma voluntarily relinquished its Asean chairmanship following harsh criticism from the world community. The Burmese government has since channelled its loyalty toward China, Russia and India, who have willingly provided it with political sanctuary.

In the Asean context, the Burma issue has always been thorny, acting as a barrier in the organisation's relations with the outside world, particular with Europe. Meanwhile, the US was sceptical about the way Asean handled Burma. This led to the renewal of American sanctions on Burma in May 2007 for another year because of the lack of a genuine dialogue between all stakeholders in Burmese politics.

When Asean opened the door for Burma in 1997, its members did not specifically hope to act as "agents of change" in the Burmese political stalemate. Logically speaking, Asean itself was vulnerable and plagued by slow progress, with more "don'ts" than "do's," with its notorious non-interference principle, and questions of legitimacy of each member government. In piggy-backing Burma, Asean felt for the first time a sense of a regional belonging against outside pressure.

This mentality has proved to be disastrous. With no real will to push for political change in Burma, Asean kept turning a blind eye to the worsening situation there. Asean members' private interests ruled over efforts to bring transformation to Rangoon. For Burma, Asean has been a fancy dress to put on so it could look normal. In reality, conditions in Burma have remained abnormal, with an ongoing civil war, a power struggle between the government and the opposition, and prolonged ethnic insurgencies.

But Asean has recently been more mature in its thinking. In the past few years, Asean leaders have spoken out vigorously that Burma would from now on have to defend itself before the international community. The Asean charter, to be finalised at the end of the year, will serve as a legal yardstick against any member who fails to abide by the rules. And there is no exception for Burma. Thus, 1997 and 2007 differ greatly in the way Asean has come to define the Burma issue. With Asean's tougher stance, one can only wait and see whether the grouping can make a real impact on Burmese political development, or if it will even drive Burma further into the arms of China and its other allies.

Thailand, with its own political deadlock, has a significant role to play on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Burma's membership of Asean. With the general election at the end of the year, and possibly with the return of the Democrat Party, Thailand's policy toward Burma may shift once again, and hopefully in contrast to its mistake in 1997.

Applying constructive engagement, flexible engagement, or whatever engagement one might call it, the bottom line is how Thailand can achieve its own national interests when dealing with Burma, on the basis of good governance and transparency. The homecoming of the Democrat Party may lighten the dark Thai-Burmese relations that have been seen since the Thaksin days.

Surin Pitsuwan, former foreign minister under the Chuan administration in the aftermath of Burma's admission to Asean, said recently in Tokyo that the Democrat Party upholds the principle of democracy and respect for human rights when it comes to managing relations with Burma.

Burma will walk a thinner line, particularly if it fails to fulfil national reconciliation and speed up the democratisation process. Asean's newfound maturity and a possible shift of Thai policy toward Rangoon will surely spoil the 10th anniversary of Burma's Asean membership, which it hopes to enjoy.

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Special to The Nation

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is the author of "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations."