We probably didn't need Gen Sonthi's confession to tell us how hopeless the situation in the region is. The daily killings serve as a constant reminder that the government is fighting a losing battle against the insurgents.

But coming from Sonthi - the man who is supposed to have all the necessary powers to put an end to the insurgency, or at least prevent it from escalating - it was nothing short of a rude awakening.  After all, wasn't it Sonthi who had been telling us all along that the government was pursuing the right strategy and was getting the situation down there under control?

In his address the general was particularly harsh on bureaucrats and members of the security forces. He deplored their inefficiency and lack of professionalism, which has contributed to the worsening of the insurgency. If anything, such a dressing down was probably what was needed to bring home the severity of the security situation in the trouble-plagued region.

While Gen Sonthi's frustration with the government's miserable failure to contain the southern insurgency is understandable, he probably also needs to look into the mirror for a self-assessment of the military leadership in its fight against the insurgency. After all, as the Army chief and CNS chairman, Gen Sonthi and his colleagues in the all-powerful junta cannot deny responsibility for the worsening situation. But harsh words aside, both the government and the Army probably also need to "think out of the box", as Sonthi urged the bureaucrats to do in order for them to get a better grasp of the problems. The Army chief is only partly right to blame the bureaucratic mindset for the inability to respond efficiently and creatively to the insurgency. There is no denying that bureaucrats and even military personnel have little or no incentive to look for new solutions; they only stick to the official line in carrying out their duty.

The situation in the South is obviously something out of the ordinary. We are facing the kind of insurgency unseen before in the recent history of the region. In place of the familiar hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, the insurgents now take the war onto the streets and make everyone a potential target. While the leadership of the separatist movements in the past was more or less public knowledge, those behind today's acts of terror are largely invisible. And yet they have been far more effective in coercing the local populace to side with them or sympathise with their cause. The authorities are not only on the defensive against the insurgents but also seem to be ineffective in the war to win the hearts and minds of the local people. The fact that villagers can be readily mobilised in their hundreds to confront the authorities every time arrests are made of terror suspects is a clear reminder of the power the insurgents have over local people.

The spiralling level of violence, which shows no signs of abating, warrants a review of the government's approach. Crisis is what we now have in the South but, rhetoric aside, judging from the way the problem is being handled, one cannot be sure whether it is being treated as such by the government and the Army.

After almost four years of continuous carnage (starting in January, 2004 with a well-coordinated raid on an Army camp in Narathiwat, in which insurgents made off with hundreds of rifles) it looks like all the authorities concerned are still unable to get their act together. This is due largely to the absence of a single command that would be responsible for working out a comprehensive strategy and implementing it.

Gen Sonthi may have control over the military but he doesn't have authority over other government agencies that are required to play an equally crucial role in neutralising the insurgency. And even within the Army itself, there are doubts whether "the best brains" are being utilised in this war on terror. The Thai military is often ridiculed for having more generals than any other armed forces in the world. Many have no specific responsibilities or assignments but enjoy the full perks and privileges that come with their rank. No wonder then, that we always hear news about military officers spending more time on golf courses or running their own businesses than working at their posts. Past efforts to make the Thai armed forces lean and mean have turned out to be nothing more than futile talk.

Because of frequent reshuffles of military personnel, there have been complaints about the lack of continuity at the command level. Most Army officers are stationed in the region by rotation and only for a specific time. Many are moved out to other posts even before they are able to familiarise themselves with the situation in the South. What we need is not only someone at the Cabinet level with the necessary powers to get all agencies involved, to toe the same line, but also the best brains in the armed forces to help at this critical time. Instead of seeing their years of training go to waste, many of these hundreds of idle generals and so-called "experts" in the military should be mobilised to fight the insurgency.

If Gen Sonthi seriously wants the rank and file to think out of the box, the example may have to start from the top.

 Thepchai Yong