To begin with, we were a "democracy", or so we convinced ourselves. We had political parties, for better or worse. And for over a decade, governments rose and fell on their parliamentary merits. But then tanks came along and here we are - reading news reports about a military junta putting more than 10,000 troops on high alert as two major political camps supported by two-thirds of the country are on the verge of being dissolved.

The notion of two democratic and highly popular political parties about to be swept away under a military regime carries a very profound meaning, not least because Thailand has experienced three political bloodbaths for arguably lesser reasons. But now is a very strange time. In 1973, tanks were the demons and students were the angels in the eyes of the public. Three years later, the opposite happened as resurgent ultra-rightists wiped out the student movement. The military became villains again in 1992. It seemed clear which side the people were on in during those three upheavals. If only things were as simple at present.

Don't be too hard on yourself if you wake up this morning and don't really feel that bad. Don't feel guilty if you, while partially or very concerned, are feeling somewhat like you are watching a show. Forgive yourself if you are feeling more curious than disappointed, or if you don't cry for the Democrats or the Thai Rak Thai Party in the event one or both of them is disbanded today.

We have failed our hard-won democracy. Amid all the blurry conscience-testing events, that much is clear. And nothing exposes a failed democracy more than the sort of widespread apathy that is overshadowing much of the Thai population at the moment. In a failed democracy, you don't quite know what's right or wrong, or who the victims, saviours or opportunists are. Everyone is blaming everyone else for bringing the nation to this low point, where ideological battles have degenerated into wars of the ego, and fighting over principles has turned into a Catch-22 situation.

The situation is eerily similar to 2001 when the Constitution Court was about to judge whether Thaksin Shinawatra breached the will of the 1997 charter and should be banned from politics. He had just won a landslide election and the pragmatist in many of us said he should be forgiven for what his family had done in the past. In the most controversial manner, the judges acquitted him, deciding to turn a blind eye on shares in servants' account, Ample Rich and other fishy transactions.

Was that the point of no return in our democracy's decline, because we chose to save him at the expense of the spirit of the 1997 constitution?

Or did Thaksin, ungrateful and unrepentant, take advantage of the great escape, strengthen himself against democratic mechanisms and put the last nail in democracy's coffin by repeating the share concealment scandal in the form of a tax-free mega deal?

But what about the "sore losers" theory? Blinded by jealousy and burning with a desire to bring him down at all costs, they were hell-bent on dethroning him from day one and Thaksin's "forgivable" and "controllable" malice was blown out of proportion at democracy's expense. The tanks didn't take advantage of Thaksin's flaws, but it was his opponents who opened the door. Democracy was not Thaksin's shield that cracked under the weight of his sins, but his rivals' sacrificial lamb.

Whichever argument has more merit, our democracy was very ill, infected still with rage, lies and revenge. And the illness feeds on the national tendency to be accommodating on matters that require unyielding principles and stubborn when the situation cries out for a compromise. Lost and confused, we envied America for carrying on with firm democracy after that photo-finish election, and were wide-eyed at a Japanese minister's suicide following a tiny bid-rigging scandal and the resignation of World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz after a trivial conflict of interest charge.

Regardless of whether the Democrat and Thai Rak Thai parties survive today, our democracy won't be any closer to a long-term cure. A drastic verdict could make things worse, whereas a soft, compromising ruling won't guarantee a way back either. Where do we go from today? What do we need as a nation?

To begin with, Thailand requires a political system that makes us care - not just when people's representatives are under threat, but also when key values are. A healthy democracy would make us want to fight when our front lines are breached; an ailing one makes us fight blindly with our backs against the wall.

Tulsathit Taptim

The Nation