The situation has only gone from bad to worse since, with the death toll crossing the 2,000 mark this month. As Thailand continues groping in the dark for ways to resolve the violence, the time has come to take stock of what has transpired.

It is obvious the government of General Surayud Chulanont is moving in the right direction by trying to win the hearts and minds of the local people. His sincere apology for all the wrongs committed by governments in the past was well received, but he must go beyond verbal remorse. The bringing to justice of those involved in the numerous abductions and senseless killings must proceed unyieldingly. The government must overrule bureaucratic red tape and expedite compensation for those wrongfully accused and murdered.

Somehow, in the past six months the government has failed to follow up on what it promised. What is worse, the non-violent approach pledged by the government earlier has been supplanted by violence allegedly committed by rangers and village defence volunteers backed by the state security apparatus. Human Rights Watch has recorded their activities in detail. Such conditions are conducive to the militants gaining new recruits and creating even more violence.

The path to a solution in the deep South is a long and treacherous one that requires lots of patience and common sense to negotiate. It would be Surayud's greatest - perhaps only - legacy if he could "stabilise" and "manage" the conflict. After all, judging from the continued public and media expressions of frustration with his government's performance, he needs to show success in the South at least.

On a visit to the region last Friday, Surayud responded positively to the proposal to grant amnesty to the insurgents in the southern provinces, put forward by Fourth Army Region Commander Lt-General Viroj Buacharoon. If enacted, the amnesty would let all the young insurgents, numbering several hundred on the security forces' blacklist, off the hook.

The amnesty idea is not a new one. It was used successfully in the 1970s and '80s to lure back communist insurgents and leftists students who joined the movement. Both the domestic and external environments at the time were conducive to ending the communist movement in Southeast Asia. The rapprochement between Thailand and China, which was the main supporter of the communist insurgency in the country, helped to usher in the new policy dealing with the problem.

Their normalisation of diplomatic ties paved the way for the cessation of armed clashes and a halt to logistic support for the insurgents. The China-Vietnam conflict also aided the demise of the Thai communist movement, because of the absence of fraternal ties and backing. When he was a young colonel, Surayud helped General Prem Tinsulanonda, who served as prime minister from 1980-88, to execute order No 26/23, which granted a blanket amnesty to communist guerrillas and leftist students who joined the movement. The policy symbolised the supremacy of the political approach over the more dangerous armed approach.

One caveat is in order, though. This kind of generous amnesty programme can be applied in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat only when there is a dispute settlement mechanism in place to ensure the cessation of violence and attacks on civilians, including some form of a truth and national reconciliation commission. Identities of conflicting parties must be traceable. An enabling external environment provided by neighbouring countries would help.

If the government were to grant amnesty hurriedly, without ending the ongoing violence, it would embolden the young insurgents to step up their daily deadly attacks. The government's goodwill gesture would be construed as a sign of weakness. Following the mid-March killing of eight civilians in a bus in Yala, the authorities labelled the insurgents as terrorists because of their persistence in targeting innocent people.

Since he came to power, Surayud's top priority has been to re-establish a network of security that would provide safety and protect communities in the deep South. Under Thaksin's leadership from 2003-06, security imperatives were completely destroyed by the reassignment of security forces and the police force's tactics trumping military ones.

After the coup, several strong measures initiated by Thaksin were cancelled. Thaksin's key approach was the use of brutality by the police force, especially those who were his classmates and in his circle of friends. The "CEO governors" of the region were given the mandate to move against the insurgents with arrests and interrogations, and through teams of exterminators committing illegal killings.

The abolition of the Southern Provinces Administrative Centre in April 2002 was part of Thaksin's strategy, which was wrongly conceived. Surayud resurrected this coordinating unit after he assumed the premiership but, somehow, it has not produced the same results as it used to do.

It is highly recommended that the Surayud government take up the proposals made two years ago by the National Reconciliation Commission on the deep South. The panel suggested effective measures to bring about an end to the violence and community reconciliation and rebuilding, including ways to properly address local grievances and to construct an environment for peaceful coexistence between the Buddhist and Muslim communities.

 Kavi Chongkittavorn