General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont announced a two-pronged strategy for dealing with the insurgency: a plan to win back the support of moderates and to improve the capacity and inter-agency relations of the security service. The former included a public apology by Surayud for the Thaksin administration's policies; the dropping of charges against 58 Tak Bai protesters; a renewed pledge to solve the disappearance of human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphaichit, now labelled a "murder"; the abolition of blacklists, ending the culture of impunity; and promises to adopt Malayu as a working language. The latter included reinstating the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC), having more consistency in personnel and policies, and improving coordination with Malaysia.

Yet, in six months, little of those promised initiatives have been implemented. Malayu is still not a working language. While pledging to punish abuses of power in the future, there is still immunity for security forces and none have been punished for the excesses of Krue Se and Tak Bai. The SBPAC remains under-staffed and under-resourced and managers from every security service have related that inter-agency competition and the hoarding of intelligence remains as bad as ever. Public trust towards the government is non-existent.

Sonthi and Surayud must do three things immediately: First, double the number of troops. There are under 25,000 troops in the area, not enough to be on constant patrols or setting up effective checkpoints, let alone go on the offensive. The recent decision by General Sonthi to not dispatch two infantry battalions to the South because they were needed for the "security of Bangkok", shows how divorced from reality he is. The people need to be given a sense of security and assurances of their and their family's safety if they are to provide critically needed intelligence.

Second, they must demand greater coordination of intelligence agencies. Agencies do not trust one another, and there is not a central repository of information. There are nearly a dozen agencies in the South. It is not just competition between the Army, police, Interior Ministry, Special Investigations Department and the National Intelligence Agency - any given agency, such as the police and military, has competing actors. The Australian government is funding a bomb-database, under the police force; will the Army contribute to it in terms of data collection or manpower? They must be given joint ownership or else the information will not be shared.

Third, they must begin reforms to the police force. To date, there have only been two successful convictions of insurgents. Very simply, the courts are throwing cases out and freeing suspected militants because of shoddy investigations and a lack of forensic evidence. This has enraged the military, which has stopped turning over many suspects. The military is not putting suspected militants on trial, holding them indefinitely, and thus further aggravating the sense of injustice felt by the broader Muslim community.

Barring these changes, the situation in the South, already grim, is going to get much worse this year. Based on trends from the first 10 weeks, we can expect several things in 2007:

First, there will not only be an increased number of attacks, but there will be a much higher death toll. In 2006 the average size of improvised explosive devices was under 5 kilograms; today 15 kg bombs are used regularly.

Second, expect the attacks to be far more provocative, such as the attack on the minivan last week. In 2007, there have already been three attacks on members of royal entourages. There have been four beheadings - one tenth of the total number - in 2007, alone.

Third, teachers and schools, those vulnerable agents of secularisation and assimilation, will be targeted in larger numbers.

Fourth, there will be more sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. There have been stepped up threats and more leaflets left by insurgents to intimidate the local Buddhist population.

Fifth, there will be more concerted attacks on economic targets: we have already seen this in attacks this year on the ethnic Chinese community on the Lunar New Year, on banks and on automotive dealerships. Attacks on rubber factories and murders of rubber tappers have led to a 15-per-cent decline in rubber production, the driving force of the economy. The attack on the minivan threatens to hamper all travel and commerce, of an already economically fragile region.

Sixth, there will be a large increase in the number of civil disobedience cases generally involving women and children. In the past they would march on police stations demanding the release of suspects. Authorities tended to acquiesce for fear of a violent confrontation. Insurgents will use these encounters to provoke a violent response that will further discredit the security forces.

The situation in the South is at a critical juncture. If the government does not quickly dedicate the necessary resources there will be an increase in Buddhist vigilante justice, creating an irreversible cycle of violence. At the same time, a larger percentage of people will begin to support the insurgents, for no other reason than the government is unable to remedy the pervasive sense of insecurity. And yet, the government is not likely to do so, remaining complacent that the violence remains contained in the four southern provinces, far away from the petty political squabbles in Bangkok.

Zachary Abuza

Special to The Nation

Boston

Zachary Abuza is a professor of political science at Simmons College, Boston. He is the author of the forthcoming book on the insurgency, "Conspiracy of Silence".