Army commander and Council for National Security chairman Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin participates in a quiz during a junta exhibition to promote good governance on Rajdamnoen Avenue yesterday.

It indicated the military-installed government was heading in the right direction to contain the trouble, but six months on, the reality is that the violence is getting worse.

As of the end of February, 6,214 violent incidents had killed 2,088 people and injured 3,920 others, according to Prince of Songkhla University's Intellectual Deep South Watch (IDSW). Violence erupted in January 2004 when a group of gunmen stormed a military unit in Nara-

thiwat, killed four soldiers and stole 400 weapons.

The previous government, led by billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, was blamed for a tough approach and misconduct that caused an escalation in the violence. Injustice and ignorance of local identity under Thaksin's direction were considered root causes.

The junta, which staged a coup on September 19 last year to topple Thaksin and all his wrongdoings, claimed it knew the situation and could do better.

The Council for National Security, led by army chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, and the interim government were praised for employing a soft approach towards the deep South. For many people, it seemed there was light at the end of a dark tunnel.

Coup supporters had high expectations that with Thaksin out of power, the violence would quickly end, with the military having a free hand to deal with the situation.

However, the junta's approach has not yet delivered any concrete results to ease the situation.

Based on data provided by IDSW, the average number of violent incidents in the five months before the coup was 146 per month, but the figure rose to 169.4 in the five months after the military take-over.

Likewise, the number of deaths per month soared from 49.2 before the coup to 64.6 after the coup.

Disturbingly, the violence is becoming more brutal, highlighted by last week's attack on a mini-bus in Yala when eight Buddhist passengers were executed.

Prince of Songkhla University academic Srisompob Jitpiromsri noted in his recent report that a high number of deaths, mostly to Muslim civilians, occurred because militants frequently used more powerful weapons such as bombs. They tended to attack soft targets such as vulnerable civilians rather than armed forces.

He pointed out that the nature of the conflict had changed as militants employed terror tactics. They used new brutal weapons to keep local people living in fear and automatically destroyed the government's authority, with residents afraid to support the state's forces.

Data indicated that violence would continue to worsen, although the government tried to introduce positive elements such as reconciliation and peaceful means into the other side of the equation.

What went wrong? Why did the attempted solution yield negative results? It might be more of an operational problem than a question of policy. Surayud's government decided to employ a soft approach and a peaceful way of dealing with the situation but never changed the structure of ground operations dramatically.

The re-establishment of the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC) has not made an impact. It was merely a revival of General Prem Tinsulanonda's legacy. The former premier set up the centre in 1981 to run the predominantly Muslim region during the decline of the separatist movement, but Thaksin dissolved it in 2002.

The revival of the centre was just a political message to say Thaksin's action was wrong, but three months on it seems as though the centre has never existed.

A plan to recruit 190 staff has not been realised because many officials were reluctant to leave their current jobs. A security official said they had no incentive to work in a dangerous zone. "Better pay at the centre is not the key answer," he said.

Selection of the centre's head reflected only nepotism in the military. Pranai Suwanrath has no experience in the deep South beyond his two years' service in Pattani's Sai Buri district long ago when he began his career as a district clerk. He got the position because he is a younger brother of Palakorn Suwanrath, a former SBPAC chief who is currently a member of the Privy Council and close to Prem.

The intelligence network, which took a lot of blame for failing to trace the movement of militants, has never been overhauled. Changing the National Intelligence Agency chief from Jumphol Manmai - regarded as close to Thaksin - to career soldier Vaipot Srinual was meaningless.

Intelligence is a key element in all wars, but the unit was never improved. It is still as poor as usual, no matter who heads it.

Vaipot was about to be transferred back to the Army due to Surayud's disappointment over Vaipot's motion to grill the government in Parliament recently, not because of his intelligence work.

Before the coup, the military blamed the failure to contain southern violence on Thaksin on the grounds that the deposed premier held too much power and relied too greatly on the police.

Now, the junta and military-backed government can blame nobody but themselves as all power and resources rest with them. If they do not get the job done now, they never will.

Academic Srisompob suggested reform in the governance and administration of the region was a sustainable way to end conflict and violence. But such a suggestion was perhaps too big and too difficult a task for the junta and its government.

Supalak Ganjanakhundee 

The Nation