A prophet on Thailand's political future

Prophets are people whose insights into the present make them shapers of the future.
We listen because their predictions match our own hopes and fears. By subtly acting on their suggestions, we help to bring about the future they predict. In the murk stirred up by Thaksin and the generals, prophets have a place. Usually we don't think of political scientists as prophets, but Anek Laothamatas fits the bill. Just over a decade ago, he asked a question which clicked with middle-class anxieties over the drift of Thai politics. How come the rural majority selects governments at the ballot box, and the urban minority throws them out by protest and scandals, resulting in chronic instability? His answer was that the rural electorate was trussed up by the patronage of local bosses. The solution was to tighten up rules to keep the bad guys out of Parliament, and get rural issues onto the agendas of political parties. This was not just political science but prophecy. The first solution inspired the 1997 constitution (chief drafter Borwornsak Uwanno acknowledged Anek's influence), and the second solution inspired the activists who compiled Thaksin's rural programme for the 2001 election. So when Anek writes again, it's worth paying attention - not because we necessarily believe him, but because he senses middle-class hopes and fears, and has the power of the prophet to make his predictions come true. The question he asks this time is an old one, but brilliantly captures the mood: in a democracy, how can you prevent the tyranny of the majority? In his book, "Thaksina-prachaniyom" (Thaksin-style populism) Anek worries that Thaksin could be a signal of even worse to come. Thaksin gave people things they wanted, and was rewarded with massive support at the polls. Even if Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party vanish from Thailand's political map, this populism will stay. Other leaders will copy it. Once one party offers people the moon, then its rivals must offer the moon and the stars. But Anek fears the risks are massive. The people become dependent on state handouts. The bureaucracy is politicised. The economy dives into the same kind of economic crises as populist Latin America. Society is sharply divided between the lower-class who benefit from populism, and the middle and upper classes who have to pay for it. Anek is not just working from theory. He left academia, joined the Democrat Party, and headed the team trying to craft a policy platform to rival the Thai Rak Thai Party. He switched to lead the Mahachon Party which was annihilated by Thai Rak Thai at the 2005 polls. When he argues that "Thaksin-type populism is very difficult to oppose", he knows what he's talking about. Anek tries to avoid saying that rural people are just stupid and so are easily fooled. But in the end he compares populism to a magic spell (sakot) which renders people stunned, mobile, and unable to resist. How then does one combat such populism? Anek's first answer is to advocate the modern welfarism of third-way thinkers like Anthony Giddens, using self-help systems and market mechanisms rather than state handouts. But he seems to lose heart in the prospect that such ideas could dazzle people at polling time. Instead he goes straight for a political solution. Anek argues that "pure democracy", the rule of the majority, is bound to lead to crude populism. "A better democracy is a balanced compromise between three elements: the representatives of the lower classes who are the majority in the country, the middle class, and the upper class." In this democracy, the only time when everybody has equal rights is when they drop their ballot paper in the box. After that "the importance of each person depends on knowledge, ability, experience, and status". That means special roles for people Anek calls ekaburut and apichon. He translates the first as monarchy, but insists this is not simply equivalent to royalty but "a few outstanding people at the highest level of society who command public trust". The latter he translates as aristocrats. It includes the middle and upper classes in general, but with a special role for people like the samurai in Japan or knights in medieval Europe who had proved themselves in battle. In the Thai case that would seem to mean the military, but Anek also mentions "top intellectuals and senior journalists". Anek claims this mixed system has been the basis of the Thai political system since October 1973. But, Anek concedes the political system cannot survive simply through chancy interventions. For the longer term, three things are needed. The countryside has to be transformed to become more self-reliant. Anek argues this will "benefit the urban middle class because grassroots people will no longer provide the foundations for populism". The lower classes have to be educated politically so they learn discipline and morality, and "upgrade their political demands" to be no longer merely self-interested but conscious of social and national benefit. This will ensure that "democracy does not give the opportunity for just anybody to exploit the weakness and short-term self-interest of the people to create policies which are irresponsible to society and nation". The two-party system has to go because this inevitably leads to competing populism. The fact that this last point has already been taken up by the drafters of the constitution is proof that Anek is still a prophet worth listening to. The implication of the book as a whole is that the constitution should increase the power of the middle and upper classes. What is most striking about the book is what is missing. In his message a decade ago, Anek stressed that the division in Thai politics between city and village was founded on a massive, unfair, and hugely resented division in income, rights, and privilege. Closing that gap was a priority. In this book, the message is still there, but buried deep. Managing the political consequences of that gap is now the priority. Government of the people, by the elite, for the middle class.
Chang Noi
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