The previous Senate became an impotent yet partisan rubber stamp for the executive - not what the 1997 constitution envisioned.

Powerful voices, including those of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, Meechai Ruchuphan, and Prasong Soonsiri are pushing for a Senate devoid of partisanship, nepotism, money politics, and institutional weakness. A tall order indeed.

So what are some potential Senate revisions? For starters, several in the military are not so sure that the Senate should be elected at all. Given the feebleness of the previously elected Senate, perhaps an upper house entirely appointed or partly selected from professional groups (including pro-military elements) might more successfully balance the executive. But is such a proposal simply a return to Thailand's Army-influenced pre-2001 Senates - a means to perpetuate military rule after returning to the barracks?

Another method of selection would be to allow the governing coalition to appoint a fixed number of senators while the opposition appoints a lesser number (as in Jamaica). Such a system would extend party power to the upper house. But why even have an upper house if it simply mirrors the lower house?

Yet another option is to modify the Senate electoral system. Worachet Pakheerat, a Thammasat University lecturer, has suggested that senators should no longer be elected by province-based constituencies and instead be picked by localities at the sub-district, municipal, and provincial levels. Alternatively, the electoral system could follow Australia and be wholly proportional (to reduce money politics) or modified to allow for mixed plurality+proportionality (as in Japan). Senate seats could even be allocated to representatives of Thais living overseas. But regardless of the system, there is no guarantee that the money and patronage of bigwigs will have no effect under a new electoral system, especially since factional vote canvassers remain powerful throughout the country.

And the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) might as well allow senators to join political parties. There is no evidence that simply prohibiting party membership has kept senators from being "political". Aristotle said it: "Man is by nature a political animal."

Another scenario might be to have senators elected in districts based upon various functional groups at the national, regional, or provincial levels.

The CDC is considering having such groups nominate senatorial candidates, after which a committee would scrutinise and select the nominees. These revisions might make senators more accountable to their constituents and less beholden to special interests. If Thailand seeks representation from functional groups, it should analyse the experiences of Ireland and Malawi. In both countries, the majority of senators are elected by groups representing labour, education, agriculture, business, and other sectors.

What about changing the size of the Senate? The CDC is already considering reducing the number of senators from 200 to 100. After all, a smaller number should be wieldier, decisions might be arrived at more quickly, committees would be smaller, and there should be greater order. But won't this result in fiercer electoral competition for fewer seats, hence more massive vote buying? Won't a smaller number of senators make it easier for factions to coalesce in the upper chamber?

Meanwhile, senators could be allowed consecutive terms (which could be shortened from 6 to 4 years). This could increase accountability and make senators more responsive to constituents.

Given the seemingly insurmountable challenges of devising a new Senate, why not abolish it altogether? According to Freedom House, there are today 122 electoral democracies in the world. Of these, 73 possess unicameral legislatures. A single house of parliament would end redundancy and produce enormous savings for taxpayers. There would be no problem with overlapping responsibilities or trouble ironing out differences in a final bill between the lower and upper houses. Thus, a single house would mean greater ease in addressing a bill at hand and approving or rejecting it. On the other hand, lack of a Senate means no chamber that can act as an umpire to re-examine bills perhaps hastily passed by the Lower House.

Ultimately, the exact role of the Senate must be spelled out. Should it be more judicial or legislative? The importance of these roles could well determine the extent of the Senate's power, the senatorial selection process (election or appointment), and the upper house's size. These three variables should not be examined separately if we want to devise a useful senatorial formula. Combinations of judicial and legislative roles are also possible but more difficult to obtain.

If we want to have the Senate play a judicial role - monitoring, appointing, and removing officials - we might appoint senators through judges because judicial responsibilities require more professionalism. The powers of such a Senate should be limited (since it is unelected) and its size should be small - judicial authorities are more effective in smaller numbers. However, if we want the Senate to play a legislative role, it should be representative of the people - selection must be through election.

In terms of a legislative role, the Senate size should depend on the form of government. If the CDC decides on a multi-party form of government, we might prefer a smaller, less powerful Senate since the coalition parties and the opposition already offset or monitor each other. As such, there may be no need for a large Senate to act as a check. But if the CDC favours a two-party system, we might prefer a large-sized, elected Senate with considerable legislative powers to balance the ruling party given that the latter controls both the legislature and executive. Such a Senate could be equipped with the filibuster. If the Senate is to stay on with both judicial and legislative roles, it certainly needs to start earning its keep, effectively monitoring and reviewing bills from the lower house, approving appointments, removing malfeasant office holders, and launching inquiries with full power to compel witnesses to appear at hearings.

The CDC is faced with a challenging task, concocting a truly workable upper house. Too weak a Senate will become another rubber stamp; too strong a Senate may lead to gridlock with the executive; no Senate means no review of bills from the lower house.

Most importantly, the drafters must ensure that the Senate remains an arena where representatives of Thai people - however partisan - can express themselves. A wholly appointed Senate, especially one hosting allies of the military, is unacceptable to any country striving towards democracy, decentralisation, and accountability.

Thais voting in the up-coming constitutional referendum must not forget that they can approve or reject what the drafters determine. They should know the Senate options available.

Paul Chambers lectures in political

science at Payap University. Napisa Waitoolkiat is a lecturer in political science at Naresuan University.

Paul Chambers, Napisa Waitoolkiat

Special to The Nation