There is little in the planned "surge" that suggests any originality in terms of political or military thinking. US politicians and military leaders have probably spent too much time debating whether to send more troops to quell the insurgency and prevent the outbreak of a full-fledged war. Much has also been said about the importance of the Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, demonstrating its commitment to take greater responsibility for Iraq's own national security.

The proposed reinforcements have never been given due consideration until now because of the growing unpopularity of the war in Iraq. The Maliki government therefore has been allowed to drag its feet, knowing that the US is more worried about being seen as losing the war in Iraq than in issuing ultimatums in order to achieve measurable success in combating insurgents and quelling sectarian strife.

But all of this has changed. With two more years left in office and a precipitous fall in his approval ratings, Bush has realised that he has no option left other than to take bold steps against all odds to try to turn the situation around. It is his only hope of avoiding going down in history as the US president who lost the war in Iraq. The problem is that the plan offers no guarantee for success.

The key measures featured in the plan should have been implemented much sooner, when the situation in Iraq was still manageable rather than now when it has deteriorated to a state of near anarchy.

These measures are little more than a rehash of old measures that were not implemented before because of indecisiveness on the part of the Bush administration.

The only thing that can be considered new and original in Bush's latest plan was borne out of necessity. The 22,000 additional troops will be dispatched to secure the capital Baghdad, where an all-out sectarian war between Shi'ites and Sunnis is expected to break out unless militias, particularly those belonging to the ascending Shi'ite majority, are neutralised and put under control.

Without the new US force to combat anti-US Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias and then to stay to secure Baghdad neighbourhoods to keep them out, the Maliki government risks losing credibility in the eyes of Iraqi people to the point where its legitimacy to govern will be lost altogether. By securing Baghdad, the Bush administration hopes to buy time for the Iraqi government to strengthen its army so that it is able to take over peacekeeping responsibilities from US forces as well as to pressure hostile parties to go to the negotiating table.

The greatest challenge for the Bush administration is determining how to scale down the US military presence over the next several years without compromising the future of Iraq as a democratic, secure, unitary state comprising Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Failing that, Iraq could descend into a failed state and become a breeding ground for international terrorists who could in turn destabilise the whole Middle East, if not also threaten the world's energy security.

All things considered, what Bush is proposing to do is to try to make the best out of the worst situation. Whether this plan will work out and turn into a success or eventually fail, the US public will be prepared for the ultimate decision to get their troops out of Iraq in defeat or in triumph.

The Iraqi people especially will be given the chance to do their utmost to make the best out of perhaps the only thing that the US has done right in their country - the toppling of Saddam Hussein - and to determine their own destiny, for better or worse.