The Council for National Security (CNS) abolished the 1997 "people's" charter, immediately doing away with the democratic aspirations that had been nurtured since 1973. Rekindling that same democratic spirit has now become the greatest political challenge for us all.

Since the coup, confusion and indecisiveness have reigned as those in power have sought to gain legitimacy, define their roles, govern the country and work towards the future. They have muddled through the past 100 days. If the same working ethos continues, the political situation in coming months could be chaotic. The series of bombs on December 31 and the subsequent rumours of repeat coups have shown the determination of the government's adversaries to undermine its credibility and terrorise the public and foreign visitors. The government's response has been criticised as too soft and laggard.

Last week, the 100-member Constitution Drafting Assembly was named. The committee is expected to complete its draft by July, thus kicking off much-needed political and government reforms. However, currently nobody - not even the most quotable astrologist in town - can predict the outcome of their deliberations. The debate on whether to allow the appointment of prime ministers, as well as the senators' party list and the level of independence of checks and balances mechanisms are still bones of contention.

Decentralisation is a mammoth issue with which the legislators must contend. Since 1997, local politics and expanded mandates at the provincial and district level have become problematic and held back democratisation efforts at the national level. Without sufficient civic political education at the grass-roots level, the quality of democracy in Thailand will not improve.

But many questions arise. How many features of the 1997 charter will be retained? Will it be old wine in a new bottle, or will it be slightly or markedly different from what we have already known? Will the new charter empower civil society and, if so, in what ways? Do the drafters of the current charter have the same democratic vision as their 1997 predecessors? Will new elements be introduced?

The government has been relatively open since the coup, however there is a lingering fear that the competitive democracy we have been accustomed to may not be the same again. The political excesses of the past five years epitomised by Thaksin Shinawatra and money politics still haunt the government and the charter drafting assembly. They are confident that unless proper and more draconian mechanisms are put in place, other autocratic leaders could emerge in the Thaksin mould.

This would definitely hamper future politics, causing it to swing from one extreme of expediency to another of rigidity. For instance, back in the mid 1990s, the desire to get rid of old politics and weak leadership reached a level of hysteria, which inevitably led drafters to devise a charter strengthening the executive branch and stifling politicians' mobility. They failed to realise that it could eventually lead to the kinds of abuses of power at which Thaksin was so masterful.

Furthermore, Thai democracy - both its successes and its failures - has much to do with the political intentions and actions of those in power. From 1997 to 2001, prior to Thaksin taking power, the 1997 constitutional framework served the country well despite some hiccups. Former prime minister Chuan Leekpai followed the letter and spirit of the people's charter without abusing his power.

It is essential for the drafting process to be transparent and accountable. If the history of writing constitutions, of which there have been 17, is any indication oftentimes even drafters with the best intentions can still allow loopholes to slip through or embed constitutional clauses with hidden agendas or potential minefields. The ambiguities in the 1997 charter must not be repeated with this one.

Charter drafters must follow Aristotle's assertion that the basis of a democratic state is liberty. Any erosion of liberty from the 1997 level must not be allowed. Of course, there is no guarantee and given the current sentiment and the fresh memories of Thaksin's malfeasance, the legislators might agree on a diminished form of democracy.

Some legislators and officials have already spoken of "sufficiency democracy" as part and parcel of the sufficiency economy. In Thai pracha thippatai poh peang might sound pleasing and reassuring but in English it is an antonym to freedom. Thai bureaucrats and developers have already treated the two concepts as mutually inclusive, which is extremely dangerous. Conservatives and royalists might want that to happen, citing the sufficiency economy as the bedrock for all blueprints.

Frankly speaking, sufficiency economy is a self-defence response to predatory globalisation practices and it should not be mingled with politics. Democracy is an open-ended political process where the rules of the game are clearly laid down. As long as there are no abuses of or diversions from the norms and the framework of the constitution, there are no limits.

In fact, democracy expands freedom in every way.

Kavi Chongkittavorn