The country's future is hanging in the balance with heavy pressure from down below and visible pressure from above, right and left and in between.

The first pivotal issue is whether the government will remain in office beyond October, the end of its one-year limit, as it will still be linked to the drafting of the new constitution, which has yet to start. The list of names of the 100 draftees will soon be announced. When it is, the drafting will begin. So far there has not been any clear indication of what the new charter will look like.

The public has expressed its doubts that the new charter will have the public interest in mind. There has been mounting criticism that the elected charter drafters are simply proxies of the Council for National Security. This allegation will only be proved true or otherwise after the drafting has been completed.

The 1997 charter remains the country's most independent and liberal so far. Any attempt to weaken the aspirations of the people will be met with outbursts of public dissatisfaction and mass rallies. After all, Thais have already tasted freedom and exercised their choices, even though it has all been a bit messy.

Even if the charter is completed as planned and an election is scheduled later in the year, there remains the fear that the same vicious political cycle will be reactivated again.

The dilemma is how and on what grounds the government might justify the extension of its one-year period of office. It is a Catch-22 situation. The new charter must encompass all the best features of the abolished charter and improve the so-called check and balance mechanism so that future governments will not be able to abuse it for their own ends. Could this be sufficient reason for the government to stay on? If the government indicates clearly that this is the path the drafters must pursue, and that it will take longer to complete, would that be acceptable?

For the time being, nobody can answer that. Somehow, the government has not convinced the public that future political reforms will be holistic and genuine. Senior officials both appointed and elected have so far shown only ambiguity.

But the government also realises that failure to do so will bring further chaos and benefit Thaksin's remnants. Nearly three months after his demise, Thaksin's name continues to provoke fear. His devilish intentions are real and include ongoing attempts at character assassinations of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and Army Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin.

What would happen if Thaksin's supporters slip back into the political system and cause havoc in the future? There is serious concern that this might pave the way for his return. Since the coup, the CNS and the government have agreed that Thaksin could continue to drive in a wedge to widen the divisions in society. He could take advantage of the divisiveness to ensure a return to politics, if not by him then through his proxies.

The other issue is a mundane one: how to reign in the bureaucrats. For the past few months, the new government has been in a learning curve, trying to follow up on issues affecting national security and domestic stability. Surayud has been trying to clean up the political mess left by Thaksin. The problem is, he relies too much on bureaucrats, who do not have the spine when it comes to honesty.

The government has realised that progress is slow because of a lack of cooperation from bureaucrats. Officials continue to drag their feet knowing full well that the government's mandate is limited to one year. There is no need to work harder and dig more dirt. What can the government do to them?

Under Thaksin, bureaucrats were targeted and often intimidated and reprimanded. Those who were willing to submit to his political will, prospered. In hindsight, policies related to security, the economy and diplomacy were directed by Thaksin but delivered by bureaucrats. For the public, these bureaucrats have been negligent in performing their basic duties.

This explains why it has been so difficult for the government to get to the crux of the corruption charges against Thaksin and his cronies, even though the key anti-graft bodies - the Office of the Auditor-General and the Assets Examination Committee - have identified at least 152 corruption cases involving 13 former Cabinet ministers. They have not yet been touched. Paper trails only go so far and cooperation from bureaucrats is hard to come by. Now the government is offering huge financial incentives for anyone coming forward with evidence related to these cases. It is doubtful this will succeed, as the culture of silence is well ingrained among senior bureaucrats.

There could be a major reshuffle in the first quarter. After all, the first 90 days were billed as a reconciliatory period. The current high tolerance for inertia will gradually disappear as October approaches. Without any change, the government will eventually have to face the public's verdict, which will be unkind. These issues will certainly shape politics this year and next. But unpredictable transitional issues might still occur and change the whole configuration.

Kavi Chongkittavorn