Whether or not it was a good idea to block the legalisation, it was good news that NLA at least tried to function the way it should.

It's also an irony that during the "democratic" time under Thaksin Shinawatra, such a bill could have sailed through the Thai Rak Thai-dominated Parliament comfortably. Despite moral, social and legal questions, no government MP would have dared to even abstain, let alone vote "no". Its passage would have been a certainty, especially considering the political stakes and potential embarrassment attached.

The Thaksin government introduced the two- and three-digit lotteries through a Cabinet resolution, which critics and legal experts say was a violation of the Government Lottery Office Act of 1974. The proper channel - through Parliament - would have restricted the use and prevented abuse of the huge revenues from the new lotteries. The former premier took full advantage of the money, primarily to finance his populist schemes, particularly educational ones.

There are two key aspects to the issue: should the government "take over" the two- and three-digit form of lottery betting from underground syndicates? And if so, how should it be introduced legally and how should the income be spent? The "takeover" debate is like every controversy over gambling legalisation. Advocates say the underground betting was already there - a mammoth, unbeatable industry that should have been exploited to boost state coffers. Opponents cite the government's responsibility to provide moral leadership, and express concern that more legitimate gambling will increase the vulnerability of the underprivileged and lure more youth to the vice.

A 2001 survey found that some 30 per cent of the population regularly played the underground lottery and about Bt325 billion a year was spent on legal and illegal gambling. The reality is that many monks, who are supposed to be a moral influence, made a living out of predicting winning numbers and newspapers boosted sales by running stories about "miraculous" plants or animals imprinted with coded lottery tips.

Thaksin, in trying to capitalise on the invincible attraction of the two- and three-digit betting, displayed great initiative and creativity. But, as with his other controversial moves, he sidestepped Parliament when it mattered most. While he managed to tap into an enormous revenue source, the Cabinet resolution virtually gave him a free hand to spend it, which he used to extreme advantage. Proceeds went mostly to the Office of the Prime Minister to support populist policies, instead of being channelled to state coffers. The police also got a share.

After the September 19 coup, the interim government was presented with a dilemma. The Council of State's belated ruling that that the two- and three-digit lotteries were in violation of the Lottery Act was big ammunition against the deposed regime, but scrapping Thaksin's clever money-making scheme meant doing away with something that had brought in Bt150 billion over just a few years.

The voices of morality in the NLA have triumphed this time. It could be a big mistake as far as the strained national budget is concerned. And the NLA's resistance might have stemmed partly from a political conspiracy against MR Pridiyathorn Devakula, the deputy prime minister and finance minister. But this could be the best possible scenario where post-coup politics is concerned. A "yes" vote would have spawned more difficult questions. Scepticism regarding the rubber-stamp role would have reached new heights. The proclaimed "morals before money" agenda of the coup-makers would have been mocked. And, having attacked Thaksin's populism and related policies, the interim leaders would have been perceived as big hypocrites.

Things have never been easy for the coup-makers. Withdrawing the lotteries bill might be tantamount to throwing away tens of billions of baht, but this may be a small test for the interim leaders given what surely will come next.