Many have expressed dissatisfaction at what they regard as a lack of progress in the investigations by various committees into corruption cases. There have been demands that the Council for National Security (CNS) use extra-legal measures, including seizing the assets of people suspected to have been involved in corrupt deals.

Dissatisfied critics reason that it is a time-consuming process to try to find hard evidence to substantiate corruption charges against these people and that there might not be enough time remaining to successfully prosecute and punish them before the CNS and the Surayud administration leave office.

The military council and interim government have promised to stage a free and fair election to produce a democratic government to take over power in about 10 months time. A lot of people are worried that the CNS and the Surayud government may not be able to take prompt and drastic action against Thaksin and his cronies, and that this will enable them to wield their enormous financial might and benefit from established ties with politicians who could easily return to power. They could also very easily use their financial clout to try to obstruct or manipulate the justice process.

But the CNS and the Surayud government should resist the temptation to take a short cut to justice by using discretionary power - which could be erroneous and open to abuse - to deal with this very important matter. The point is not so much about swift and arbitrary justice but ensuring that justice is only done, and is seen to be done.

Let's not forget that the reasons cited as justification for the September 19 coup to overthrow the Thaksin government included alleged corruption, abuse of authority, violation of civil liberties and disregard for the rule of law. Surely, the CNS and the Surayud government would not want to fall into the same trap.

Limiting corruption in politics at the national level would improve the chance of Thailand's democracy making a full recovery after five and half years under Thaksin. But not nearly enough attention has been paid to the importance of dismantling the power base of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party, which remains strong among the rural masses. The populist policies implemented by Thaksin and his party not only pandered to the unprincipled wants and needs of poor and impressionable people, they also enabled the party to extend its tentacles of power in all parts of the country, particularly the countryside.

Populist policies such as the village funds, which were no more than a revolving credit scheme, were extremely popular among rural people because they represented generous entitlements granted to them by the Thaksin government. Failure to impose stringent screening measures on prospective borrowers and their loan proposals meant the low-interest programme was widely abused and fraught with corruption.

To make sure Thaksin was able to effectively manipulate and control the rural masses, village-based committees set up to screen prospective borrowers and approve loans were filled with Thai Rak Thai supporters. That was how whole villages were converted into bastions of Thai Rak Thai functionaries and supporters. Such a patronage system, supplemented by cash handouts during election times, guaranteed Thai Rak Thai landslide victories at the polls without fail. The Thai Rak Thai Party was thus able to grab power in the overwhelming majority of constituencies in all regions of the country. The only place it failed to gain a strong foothold, or any kind of support at all, was in the South and deep South. That's why the Thai Rak Thai Party could be expected to win hands down if a general election was held tomorrow.

Unless the CNS and the Surayud government expand the clean-up campaign to include a crackdown on corruption at the grassroots level and a public education programme to teach rural people how democracy is supposed to function, the future of democracy in this country will remain uncertain.