The national convention is the first of the seven steps in the government's roadmap to democracy, but has been dismissed by opposition figures within and outside of Burma for lacking democratic principles.

As political reforms in Burma have been carried out with little success, the global community is rethinking its approach to deal with the regime more effectively. But this rethinking process is not an easy task. There is great division in the global community over the prospects for political change in Burma, the degree of threat Burma poses to its neighbours, and effective measures to encourage greater freedom in the country.

Despite the remaining policy differences among various countries towards Burma, their aims and objectives have commonalities. These are the achievement of national reconciliation, the restoration of democracy and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. It is therefore imperative to come up with a common approach that would be best not only for Burma but for the region too.

So far, the approaches of various countries have been mutually contradictory. The United States considers Burma a "serious threat to peace and security", citing the junta's strategy that led to a range of destabilising problems, such as drugs and human trafficking. The European Union's objective is however less strict, and its approach is less emotional than the US. This explains why the EU agreed with the multilateral approach in discussing Burma at the United Nations.

For Japan, democracy and human rights are uppermost in its foreign policy objectives and its assistance to Burma has thus been suspended. Meanwhile, Australia has continued to provide modest indirect assistance to Burma, such as conducting courses on human rights for Burmese police personnel. But there has also been cautious engagement in areas that might affect Australia's interests.

Asean seems to have changed its approach, particularly after Burma was pressured to skip its turn at the rotating chairmanship of the organisation. Thailand, sharing a common and volatile border with Burma, has preferred engagement to sanctions, claiming that Burmese cooperation, both bilaterally and in frameworks like ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy), is paramount to the Thai national interest.

Recognising these conflicting approaches, Burma successfully exercised its weakness and problems as a tool to divide its neighbours and great powers and hit at their soft spots. These countries urgently need a common approach to bring about changes in Burma. Such a process would require some "give" on the part of each state, and with the right mix of stick and carrot, there could be progress in Burma.

It is obvious that non-interference and total sanctions against Burma have not worked during the past 16 years. On the contrary, they have generated counterproductive results such as the extension of Suu Kyi's house arrest and the continuing imprisonment of Burmese political activists. The sanctions also failed partly because the countries involved were far too tactical and distracted by great power politics and other economic interests.

A reassessment of this approach towards Burma is crucial, as it would be foolish to sustain such a course of action when it has proven ineffective. First and foremost, one has to reject a simplistic "black and white" treatment of sanctions, where non-support for sanctions was equated with support for the junta. In fact, Suu Kyi mentioned in 2002 that her National League for Democracy party did not approve of all kinds of international sanctions. Some humanitarian assistance remains essential for the ordinary Burmese.

The challenge facing the UN Security Council is the ability to handle the issue with prudence and in a non-confrontational manner. It is worth reconsidering whether Burma is really a "regional security threat" or if this is a case of the situation being exaggerated. It is fair to say that China, India and other countries in the region would not describe Burma as a threat with which they cannot cope. It is also unlikely that Asean perceives Burma as hindrance to its integration. Burma is simply a "black mark" on Asean.

Such thinking is intended not to shield Burma from international criticism, but to mirror the realities on the ground and to point where sanctions met with failure. In the past, the sanctions were meant to hurt the government, but on balance, they instead contributed to the economic misery of the common people. Moreover, rather than isolating Burma, the sanctions isolated the world from Burma and deprived it of influence over the country's development.

What the international community needs now is "smart sanctions", in which the imposition of sanctions is put forward alongside dialogue, humanitarian assistance and the use of soft power. Not all countries need to exercise the same degree of pressure against Burma. It depends on the individual country. And Thailand can play its part through its engagement policy with Burma.

Humanitarian intervention is vital in this process and where the Security Council can advise alleviating the human rights situation in Burma. Currently, Germany is the only European country that still gives scholarships to Burmese officials. Educational assistance is fundamental to changing the mindset of those in the government, and it is important not to treat the Burmese government as a unitary actor. It was also a mistake to include children of the Burmese elite in visa bans because this prevents them from studying at Western universities.

The most ambitious, or rather controversial, suggestion here is to encourage more trade, investment and other cultural activities with the Burmese government. Tourism represents one key component because every tourist is an agent of change and a source of income, not only for the government but also for many individuals involved in the industry.

Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is the author of 'A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations'.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Special to The Nation